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Article

The Free Speech Rights of University
Students
†

Mary-Rose Papandrea

In March 2014, University of Oklahoma President David
Boren reacted swiftly when a video surfaced online revealing
1
members of the SAE fraternity singing a racist song on a bus.
Two young men leading the singing were immediately expelled.
Boren explained in a letter to the students that they had been
expelled due to their “leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary chant which has created a hostile educational envi2
ronment for others.” Several prominent First Amendment
scholars denounced the expulsions, arguing that the racist
3
speech was entitled to constitutional protection.

† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of
North Carolina School of Law. Copyright © 2017 by Mary-Rose Papandrea.
1. The song is set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It,” and
appears to contain the following lyrics:
There will never be a . . . SAE
There will never be a . . . SAE
You can hang ’em from a tree
But he’ll never [inaudible—possibly “sign”] with me
There will never be a . . . SAE.
Matt Pearce, Is University of Oklahoma Frat’s Racist Chant Protected by 1st
Amendment?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na
-oklahoma-fraternity-explainer-20150310-story.html#page=1.
2. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Expulsion of Two Oklahoma Students over Video Leads to Free Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/expulsion-of-two-oklahoma-students
-leads-to-free-speech-debate.html?_r=0.
3. See, e.g., id. (summarizing views of prominent First Amendment experts); Pearce, supra note 1 (quoting experts stating that the speech is protected); Eugene Volokh, No, It’s Not Constitutional for University of Oklahoma
To Expel Students for Racist Speech [UPDATED in Light of Students’ Expulsion], WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/10no-a-public
-university-may-not-expel-students-for-racist-speech.
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All around the country, colleges and universities are increasingly punishing or censoring students who engage in offensive speech. While concerns that a failure to act will lead to
liability under federal anti-discrimination law may offer a partial explanation for this conduct, in many instances the possibility of liability is weak or non-existent. Except in the most extreme circumstances, schools are not required to expel students
for their speech in order to avoid liability. Instead, schools appear to punish students for their expressive activities in order
to demonstrate a steadfast commitment to fostering a tolerant
4
and inclusive environment.
The question this Article seeks to address is whether the
First Amendment affords public institutions of higher education special latitude to punish students for their offensive
5
speech. Although universities are frequently recognized as the
6
“quintessential marketplace of ideas,” arguments that public
colleges and universities have—or should have—some measure
of institutional academic freedom to restrict offensive speech
have been gaining traction. Around the country, public colleges
and universities have been asserting broad authority to punish
7
or restrict their students’ speech and associational rights. In

4. PEN America’s October 2016 report summarizes the current debate as
one raising “serious questions about how rights to free speech, freedom of assembly, and academic freedom intersect with the quest to address some of the
most vexing challenges of diversity and inclusion faced by students, faculty,
and administrators.” PEN AM., AND CAMPUS FOR ALL: DIVERSITY, INCLUSION,
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES 4 (2016), https://pen.org/sites/
default/files/PEN_campus_report_final_online_2.pdf [hereinafter PEN AM.
REPORT]. The vice chancellor for legal affairs at UCLA has similarly observed
that “[t]hese situations are very, very challenging for universities.” Pearce, supra note 1 (quoting Kevin Reed’s explanation that “when there’s ‘conduct and
behavior that makes members of the student body feel unsafe, unprotected, a
subject of hate . . . universities have an obligation to act to try to remedy that
situation, to prevent it . . . . Balancing that obligation with the 1st Amendment
is the university’s challenge’”).
5. This Article will focus on public colleges and universities because the
First Amendment does not apply at private institutions of higher education.
To the extent that private institutions look to First Amendment doctrine for
guidance, however, the analysis in this Article may be useful in that context as
well.
6. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
7. Chad Flanders, Oklahoma Frat Case Touches on a Surprisingly
Murky Area of Law, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.cleveland
.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/03/oklahoma_frat_case_touches_on.html (suggesting the possibility that public university students have the same limited
speech rights as public employees).
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addition to punishing students for their non-curricular expression, like the University of Oklahoma example offered at the
outset, public colleges and universities are increasingly punishing students for their speech when it is deemed inconsistent
with vague “professionalism” standards and imposing sweeping
requirements that student-athletes essentially waive their
First Amendment rights as a condition of participation in an
extracurricular activity.
This Article concludes that the authority of public universities to restrict student speech is, or at least should be, quite
narrow. In reaching this conclusion, the Article confronts and
rejects arguments that public universities should receive broad
institutional deference to restrict student speech in the name of
improving the educational environment. Any deference public
universities receive must be limited to speech that occurs in the
context of academic activities, and any such deference they do
receive should not be absolute.
Furthermore, this Article contends courts should resist the
growing use (or misuse) of the government speech doctrine.
Under the government speech doctrine, First Amendment re8
strictions do not apply when the government itself is speaking.
Although it should be clear that students, particularly college
and university students, do not speak for the university, institutions of higher education are increasingly caving to various
constituencies inside and outside of the university who believe
that they do. Rather than appreciating the traditional role of
the university as the quintessential marketplace of ideas, students, alumni, and the public frequently appear to believe that
whenever a school tolerates offensive speech, the university is
endorsing those viewpoints.
Part I of this Article outlines some of the recent issues involving online student speech that have arisen in the higher
education context, particularly in the age of social media. This
initial Part outlines the potential for liability schools might face
under federal statutes for creating or permitting hostile educational environments and concludes that fears of liability under
these statutes cannot fully explain why universities are increasingly less tolerant of offensive speech. Part II sets out the
contours of traditional First Amendment doctrine, which offers
robust protection for offensive speech except when it crosses the
line into certain categories of unprotected or lesser-protected
8. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
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speech. Part III expands on the doctrinal analysis of Part II
with close consideration of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
relating to students in both the K–12 and higher education setting. One of the key questions in this Part is whether the
Court’s decisions in the K–12 context should have any application in the higher education setting. This Part argues that these cases should have little, if any, application when public colleges and universities have punished their students because
the population and function of the two types of educational institutions are fundamentally different. Part IV focuses on the
question of whether institutions of higher education should be
given deference to punish speech that does not fit into their educational mission. This Part concludes that such deference is
dangerous and misplaced in the university environment.
I. STUDENT SPEECH TODAY
Since at least the 1970s, universities have struggled to determine whether to accommodate offensive speech on campus,
9
and hate speech codes have been around since the 1980s. But
today’s calls for greater control of speech on campus are arguably even louder, stronger, and more robust than they have been
in past decade, and arguably include demands to restrict much
more speech.
Public colleges and universities are struggling more than
ever to balance their obligations under the First Amendment
10
and their desire to create inclusive communities. While student pressure to punish those who engage in offensive speech
grows, so does a backlash to this pressure, echoed in the politi11
cal debates in our increasingly polarized society. The development of e-mail, social media, and mobile phones has complicated already complex questions about whether and when a

9. See Benjamin M. Welch, An Examination of University Speech Codes’
Constitutionality and Their Impact on High-Level Discourse 1–13 (Aug. 2014)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska), http://digitalcommons.unl
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=journalismdiss (providing a
history of university free speech codes).
10. See Susan Svrluga, Slurs, Blackface, and Gorilla Masks: The Academic Year Opened with Racial Ugliness, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/10/07/slurs
-blackface-and-gorilla-masks-the-academic-year-opened-with-racial-ugliness/
?tid=hybrid_collaborative_1_na (describing various racially charged incidents
on college campuses across the country, university responses, and subsequent
societal debate).
11. Id.
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university can—or even must—punish students for their digital
expressive activities occurring both on and off campus, and in12
side and outside of the curricular setting.
In recent years, public colleges and universities have faced
pressure to shut down social media websites and apps known to
host offensive content. In past years, the most popular targets
13
14
were Autoadmit.com and JuicyCampus.com; more recently,
students around the country have asked administrators to
15
block access to a popular mobile phone app Yik Yak. Yik Yak
allows users to post anonymous messages to people within a
small geographic radius. Although the app has some positive
16
uses, it also has been used to call for the lynching of the black
student body president, the gang rape at a university women’s
17
center, and countless other offensive statements.
When universities can determine who is making offensive
statements, then it faces calls to punish those students, and to
do so quickly. The University of Oklahoma case mentioned at
the outset of this Article is one example. Another occurred in
September 2016 when Kansas State University expelled a student who posted on Snapchat picture of herself using a cosmetic clay mask with the racially offensive caption, “[f ]eels good to
18
finally be a [racial slur].” Other universities have punished
19
students for similar types of expression.

12. Public colleges and universities also must grapple with professor and
staff speech issues, but those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
13. Ilana Seager, Law Graduates Settle Suit, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 23,
2009), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2009/10/23/law-graduates-settle-suit.
14. Robert Shibley, Tennessee State Bans JuicyCampus.com from Network, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.thefire
.org/Tennessee-state-bans-juicycampuscom-from-network.
15. Tasnim Shamma, Yik Yak Tests Universities’ Defense of Free Speech,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2016/01/23/463197593/yik-yak-tests-universities-defense-of
-free-speech.
16. Amanda Hess, The Upside of Yik Yak, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2015), http://
www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/03/yik_yak_the_anonymous_
messaging_app_with_a_terrible_rep_is_actually_pretty.html.
17. Shamma, supra note 15.
18. Susan Svrluga, “I Am Truly Sorry”: Student Apologizes for Snapchat
Image that Had Racial Slur, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/18/i-am-truly-sorry-former
-kansas-state-student-apologizes-for-snapchat-image-that-had-racial-slur.
19. Quinnipiac expelled a student who posted on Snapchat a picture of a
friend wearing a cosmetic clay mask with the caption “Black Lives Matter.”
Leigh Frillici, Student No Longer at Quinnipiac After Posting Racially Insensitive Snapchat Photo, WTNH NEWS 8 (Sept. 21, 2016), http://wtnh.com/
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To be sure, not all universities respond with immediate expulsions. A quick look at how various public and private universities have handled these situations reveals the range of
possibilities. For example, when a UCLA student posted a video
20
mocking “Asians in the Library,” UCLA responded with a
21
statement from the Chancellor condemning the video. UCLA
did not expel the student, although the student withdrew anyway after apologizing and citing concerns for her own safety on
22
campus. But even UCLA has become quicker to punish students for their offensive speech as student demands for the
23
punishment of speakers have grown more strident.
2016/09/21/quinnipiac-student-no-longer-with-quinnipiac-after-posting
-racially-insensitive-snapchat-photo. Several students at the University of
North Dakota posted pictures of themselves in clay masks with the same caption, “Black Lives Matter.” Jack Jenkins, White North Dakota Students Dress
in Blackface, Post Picture with Caption ‘Black Lives Matter,’ THINKPROGRESS
(Sept. 24, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/north-dakota-blackface
-1a2233a5e24f#.mrpq2q3r4. Around the same time, another group of students
stole their roommate’s phone and posted a picture of themselves on her
Snapchat account with the caption, “[w]e locked the black bitch out!” Peter
Holley, ‘Inexcusible’: Students’ Photos, One in Blackface, Trigger Backlash and
University Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/26/inexcusable-students
-blackface-photos-trigger-backlash-university-investigation. These expulsions
also raise serious due process concerns as well. One can only speculate that
some universities have decided that appearing to be sympathetic to calls for
an “inclusive” and “safe” environment are worth the subsequent costs of violating constitutional rights.
20. SirBigDickNigga, Asians in the Library: UCLA Rant (Original Uncut
Video) and Apology, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=zQR01qltgo8.
21. Gene D. Block, Chancellor Block Appalled by Student Video Disparaging Asians, UCLA NEWSROOM (Mar. 14, 2011), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/
stories/chancellor-block-statement-199032. The university communicated its
message both through a statement as well as a video of its own that it posted
on YouTube. UCLA, UCLA Chancellor Appalled by Student Video, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6feGp0GQVJ8. Other students also responded with their own videos. See, e.g., Jimmy Wong, Ching
Chong! Asians in the Library Song (Response to UCLA’s Alexandra Wallace),
YOUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zulEMWj3sVA.
22. Kate Parkinson-Morgan, Alexandra Wallace Apologizes, Announces
She Will No Longer Attend UCLA, DAILY BRUIN (Mar. 18, 2011), http://
dailybruin.com/2011/03/18/alexandra_wallace_apologizes_announces_she_
will_no_longer_attend_ucla.
23. Conor Friedersdorf, The Anti-Free-Speech Movement at UCLA, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/
the-anti-free-speech-movement-at-ucla/410638. In October 2015, the university suspended a fraternity and sorority for holding a mixer called “Kanye Western” in which partygoers dressed as Kanye West and Kim Kardashian. Some
of those dressing as Kanye apparently wore baggy clothes and soot on their
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Some scholars have argued that universities need to punish students who engage in offensive speech online to avoid liability under Title VI and Title IX. All universities are subject to
these federal anti-discrimination laws. Title IX provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assis24
tance.” The Court has held this statute supports a private
25
cause of action alleging hostile environment harassment. In
order for a college or university to be liable, a plaintiff must
show that the conduct at issue is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from
the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students
are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources
26
and opportunities.” In addition, the plaintiff must prove the
institution had “actual knowledge” of this conduct and acted in
27
a manner suggesting “deliberate indifference.” Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin in “any program or activity receiv28
ing Federal financial assistance.” The Supreme Court has
held that like Title IX, Title IV supports a private cause of ac29
tion alleging intentional discrimination.
Schools’ exposure to liability under federal law for permitting the existence of a hostile educational environment is much
narrower than many universities might realize. Speech is not
actionable unless it creates a hostile environment that is “se-

faces (it is not clear this was blackface); those dressing as Kim wore big fake
butts. When pictures of the party appeared on social media, some students
claimed the costumes were racist. The partygoers claimed they were mocking
pop culture by dressing up as specific people; they claim no one wore blackface
but rather were dressed up as miners with soot on their faces. UCLA issued a
statement: “While we do not yet have all the facts, the alleged behavior is inconsistent with good judgment as well as our principles of community.” See
Veronica Rocha, Kanye West-Themed Frat Party at UCLA Sparks Protest,
Claims of Racism, L.A TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-ucla-blackface-kanye-party-20151008-story.html.
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
25. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
26. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
27. Id. at 642–43.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
29. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) (holding private
parties may sue under Title VI to challenge intentional discrimination and
that disparate impact claims are not cognizable).
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30

vere or pervasive.” A single, isolated instance of speech does
not generally give rise to a hostile environment claim unless it
31
is “extraordinarily severe.” The offensiveness of the speech is
32
evaluated under an objective reasonable person standard. A
few Title VII cases in the lower courts involving employees who
display the Confederate flag are instructive. In these cases, the
hostile environment claims generally lost, for several possible
reasons: employers were unable to demonstrate that the Con33
federate flag actually disrupted the workplace; the speaker’s
34
co-workers were not exposed to the speech in the workplace;
and no reasonable person could be offended by the flag accom35
panied by the words “[h]eritage, not [h]ate.” Furthermore, unlike employers, university officials are not as likely to face the
dilemma of retaining an employee, particularly a supervisor,
who engages in offensive speech that might be used down the
road to support a negligent retention claim or discrimination
36
lawsuit.
In the context of discussing the University of Oklahoma
video, Professor Noah Feldman has argued that “[g]iven that
the speech was literally designed to inculcate the value of racial
discrimination by making pledges recite their commitment
never to admit a black member to the fraternity . . . [r]emoving
the chant leaders from campus is aimed to fulfill the educa30. Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2004).
31. See, e.g., id. at 59 (“It is . . . ‘well settled in this Circuit that even a
single act’ [can create a hostile environment if it is] ‘extraordinarily severe’
. . . .” (citing Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000))).
32. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
33. Carpenter v. City of Tampa, No. 8:03 CV 451 T 17 EAJ, 2005 WL
1463206 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2005) (holding employee had First Amendment
right to leave Confederate flag decal on his private vehicle).
34. Greer v. City of Warren, Civ. No. 1:10-cv-01065, 2012 WL 1014658
(W.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012) (holding a police officer had a First Amendment
right to post the Confederate flag at his private residence and on his private
MySpace page, given the lack of evidence that his co-workers were exposed to
the flag in the workplace); Erickson v. City of Topeka, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1131,
1138 (D. Kan. 2002).
35. Erickson, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; see also Clay v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., No. 13-2240-SAC, 2014 WL 5298173 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2014)
(“Plaintiff complained about the flag, Defendant investigated it, found no racial animus, and concluded that the employee was free to display the flag in
her car window. This was a reasonable conclusion which does not demonstrate
race discrimination on the part of the employer.”).
36. Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is
It Proper?, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1434–38 (2005) (explaining liability risks
employers face if they retain employees who engage in racial or other offensive
speech).
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tional goal of creating a nonhostile educational environment.”
Feldman recognizes, however, that “[i]t’s a tricky question
whether speech not directed at anyone in particular should be
38
treated as conduct creating a hostile environment.” While
some universities may punish offensive speech out of an excess
39
of caution, it seems unlikely that a fear of liability offers a full
explanation for the increasing punishment of offensive speech.
Indeed, universities have cited other reasons for punishing
offensive speech that have nothing at all to do with antidiscrimination laws. For example, a recent trend among universities is to justify the punishment of students for offensive
40
speech as incompatible with the student’s chosen profession.
For example, in 2010 a mortuary student at the University of
Minnesota was placed on probation, received a failing grade in
a class, and was forced to complete a psychiatric evaluation after she posted several sarcastic and joking comments about cadavers on her personal Facebook page. The Supreme Court of
41
Minnesota upheld the university’s actions. The Tenth Circuit
held that an acting program could exclude a student who refuses to use profanity, unless she can prove that religious discrim42
ination was a primary factor for the professors’ decision. More
recently, the Eighth Circuit upheld a public college’s decision to
remove a student from a nursing program for unprofessional

37. Noah Feldman, Balancing the First Amendment vs. Racist Chants at
Oklahoma, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2015, at C23.
38. See id.; see also Cristian Farias, The Two Oklahoma Students Expelled
for Their Racist Chant Have a Strong Free Speech Defense, NEW REPUBLIC
(Mar.
11,
2015),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121269/oklahoma
-fraternity-racist-video-shouldnt-get-students-expelled (expressing concern
that the hostile environment justification is too malleable to satisfy First
Amendment standards); See AMY GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME 92 (2009)
(“The difficulty for universities is that they are caught between expanding legal protections for both free speech and nondiscrimination on campus, with
relatively little reliable guidance from the courts about how the sometimes
conflicting mandates are to be reconciled.”).
39. Of course, as Eugene Volokh has pointed out in the context of hostile
environment claims in the employment context, an employer can’t just tell its
employees, “you can generally make [offensive] statements, but not when they
in the aggregate are so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile environment.”
Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work
Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305, 310 (1996).
40. For an excellent article on this trend, see Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013).
41. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
42. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
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conduct for sarcastic comments he made on his Facebook page
relating to his frustrations with a group project and his fellow
43
students’ failure to use mechanical pencils. The Ninth Circuit
also recently relied on a “professionalism” standard when it
upheld a school’s decision to reject a student from a student44
teaching program.
Universities have also stepped up their efforts to control
45
the speech of their student-athletes. As a condition of participating in a sport, public university students must consent to
the monitoring of their social media accounts and agree not to
post anything on those accounts that would place the university
46
in a bad light. Although these attempts to control athletes’
speech may, in some cases, be connected to improving team dynamics and performance, they also appear to be motivated by
an interest in preventing these high-profile students from representing the school in embarrassing or politically unpopular
ways. For example, student athletes who chose to kneel during
the playing of the national anthem to protest police killings of
African Americans have come under a firestorm of criticism,
with alumni and even state legislators threatening to cut off
47
funding to the university and the athletic program. At East
Carolina University (ECU), the university faced a firestorm of
criticism from angry alumni threatening to end their financial
support of the school after a number of football players kneeled
during the National Anthem. Initially, the ECU Chancellor issued a press release recognizing that although some fans may
43. Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d. 523 (8th Cir. 2016).
44. Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a
challenge to expulsion of a student based on his statements in a reflection assignment that he believed online child predation should be legal and that
highly disabled students should not be mainstreamed).
45. Ken Paulson, Twitter Crackdowns Do College Athletes, Free Speech No
Favors, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter
.org/twitter-crackdowns-do-college-athletes-free-speech-no-favors (summarizing recent trends).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Associated Press, Arkansas Players Face Backlash After
Kneeling During Anthem, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2016), http://sports.usatoday
.com/2016/11/08/arkansas-players-face-backlash-after-kneeling-during-anthem
-2 (reporting some Republican lawmakers threatened to cut off funding to the
University of Arkansas sports program); Jane Stancill, ECU Faculty Groups
Support Free Speech Rights After Band Protest, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 2,
2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article112161412
.html (reporting ECU Faculty Senate passed a resolution in favor of the students after Chancellor received complaints from alumni threatening to cut off
donations, and parents threatened to withdraw their students).
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have been “disappoint[ed]” with the students’ kneeling, their
protest was “part of the free exchange of ideas on a university
48
campus.” Soon thereafter, however, other university officials,
including the band director, director of the School of Music, and
the dean for the School of Arts and Communications, issued a
second press release indicating that the university would not
respect the students’ exercise of their speech rights: “While we
affirm the right of all our students to express their opinions,
protests of this nature by the Marching Pirates will not be tol49
erated moving forward.” Even North Carolina Governor Pat
McCrory condemned the students, asserting that “[t]hey have
every right to express their First Amendment rights outside the
50
stadium.”
Several commentators have offered theories for why large
numbers of college students today are calling for speech re51
strictions on their campuses. Defenders of student activists
contend that these students are continuing “the American tradition of using free expression and civil disobedience to advance
social change,” particularly given “the vital imperatives of racial and gender justice” that are important not just on colleges
52
campuses but in society at large. These tensions might be
magnified on campuses where student bodies are more diverse
than ever, coming from “vastly different backgrounds, cultures,
53
and levels of economic and even physical security.” In addition, some have argued that “political life and discourse is at
the boiling point” with the election of President Trump, and

48. Statement from Dr. Cecil Stanton, Chancellor, E. Carolina Univ. (Oct.
1, 2016), https://mgtvwnct.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/ecu-chancellor
-statement.pdf.
49. See Jessica Chasmar, East Carolina University: Future Protests of National Anthem ‘Will Not Be Tolerated,’ WASH. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/4/east-carolina-university-future
-protests-of-nation.
50. Jane Stancill, ECU Band Protest Still Stoking Strong Emotions, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/
education/article106695287.html (reporting McCrory’s reelection campaign
was distributing copies of his videotaped interview where he made this statement).
51. Although surveys suggest students value free speech on college campuses, alarmingly high numbers also say they would support speech restrictions on “racist, sexist, homophobic, or otherwise offensive” expression as
well as restrictions on Halloween costumes based on offensive stereotypes.
PEN AM. REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 13.
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they may see “free speech” as a cover for attacks on marginal54
ized people.
Critics characterize activists as “coddled students” who
55
have no tolerance for “dissent and offense.” Some complain the
reason some students advocate for “trigger warnings” and “safe
spaces” is that that young people today do not grow up as inde56
pendently as they once did. In many places around the country, kids are no longer allowed to play outside unsupervised as
fears of abduction run rampant. Sheltered by their “helicopter
parents,” some lament, college students today are still closely
connected to their families, perhaps in part due to technological
57
developments like cellphones, social media, and e-mail. As a
result, the argument runs, college has become a time of an “extended period of adolescence” rather than a time when students
58
transition to full adulthood. Under this theory, higher education students still want their parents, teachers, and administrators to set rules about what is permitted—and not permitted—in civil discourse.
It is also possible that university administrators are simply
increasingly less tolerant of offensive speech. This may be the
59
result of “liberal intolerance” of conservative ideas. Proportionately few professors are conservative; some studies suggest
that conservatives find it harder to get academic positions and
60
are stigmatized if they do manage to get hired. As one commentator provocatively quipped, “We’re fine with people who
61
don’t look like us, as long as they think like us.”

54. Allison Stanger, Understanding the Angry Mob at Middlebury that
Gave Me a Concussion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/13/opinion/understanding-the-angry-mob-that-gave-me-a-concussion
.html.
55. Id. at 4.
56. See, e.g., Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356.
57. Id.
58. A. Douglas Stone & Mary Schwab-Stone, The Sheltering Campus: Why
College Is Not Home, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
02/07/education/edlife/adolescent-development-college-students.html.
59. Nicholas Kristof, A Confession of Liberal Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES (May
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/opinions/sunday/a-confession-of
-liberal-intolerance.html.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Intolerance for offensive speech may also stem from a de62
sire to please demanding students. Universities may worry
that offensive speech on their campuses will impact the university “brand” and turn away prospective students, who are look63
ing for a more nurturing environment. New York Times columnist Frank Bruni has identified a worrying trend in higher
education where students “have come to act as customers—the
ones who set the terms, the ones who are always right—and
64
the degree to which they are treated that way.” Universities
that refuse to censor offensive speech risk being labeled insen65
sitive or even racist. One commentator to an op-ed defending
the expelled University of Oklahoma students said:
If the behavior of those students is unchecked, then that behavior is
representative of and reflects upon the University and its culture on
several levels.
Naturally, no institution or organization, private or public, wants
to be seen as condoning or approving in any way such racist (or sexist
66
or any other) behavior.

In the age of social media, it is easier for offensive speech to go
viral, “infect” the university environment, and tarnish the uni62. There are notable exceptions to this; one example is the 2016 University of Chicago letter to first-year students. Richard Pérez-Peña, Mitch Smith,
& Stephanie Saul, University of Chicago Strikes Back Against Campus Political Correctness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/
27/us/university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness
.html.
63. See PEN AM. REPORT, supra note 4, at 43 (noting another important
trend is “viewing students as paying consumers who must be satisfied by their
experience on campus, lest they vote with their checkbooks by transferring to
a new institution, or use their influence on social media and elsewhere to tarnish the university’s reputation”).
64. Frank Bruni, In College Turmoil, Signs of a Changed Relationship
with Students, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
23/education/in-college-turmoil-signs-of-a-changed-relationship-with-students
.html. Bruni has been one of the most outspoken critics of the “striking transformation” in the last twenty-five years of the money schools are willing to
spend to provide their students with amenities like spruced up dormitories,
more luxurious dining halls, better equipped gymnasiums, and state-of-the-art
swimming pools, putting greens, arcades, theaters, and even water parks. Id.
65. See S. Cagle Juhan, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech
Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1592–93 (2012) (noting that “powerful student interest groups . . . lobby administrators, who, in turn, face substantial
pressure to avoid appearing insufficiently attentive to certain constituencies,
as well as to diversity and tolerance norms”).
66. AstraiaOrianthia, Comment to Oklahoma Students’ Racist Song Is
Protected Speech: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www
.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/03/oklahoma_students_hateful_sing
.html.

1814

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1801

versity’s reputation. Universities are less concerned about the
backlash they might face from over-zealously censoring offensive speech because students face tremendous pressure not to
engage in such speech at all, and those who do often accept
67
their punishments without legal challenge.
Students and administrators also appear more willing to
credit emotional harm as a reason to silence speakers. Indeed,
this same trend can be seen in some recent First Amendment
scholarship debating whether the Court’s jurisprudence fails to
account for the real “harm”—as in emotional harm—some of68
fensive speech can cause. As Greg Lukianoff of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education has argued, it seems to
be “generally considered unacceptable to question the reasonableness . . . of someone’s emotional state, particularly if those
69
emotions are linked to one’s group identity.” Students are admirably passionate about the issues of the day, like the Black
Lives Matter movement, which largely center around equality.
Many activists want to eradicate not just discrimination but an
70
entire environment that makes discrimination possible. As
one public intellectual has pointed out, these activists “want to
police social norms so that hurtful comments are no longer tol71
erated and so that real bigotry is given no tacit support.” Under this approach, discussions about difficult topics are not tolerated even when they are simply “bringing unacceptable
72
words [or ideas] into the public square.” Relatedly, another
possible explanation for the heated debate on college campuses
67. Juhan, supra note 65, at 1593 (“There are also strong disincentives for
students to advocate for, much less litigate, their free speech rights in the face
of university hostility.”).
68. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011
SUP. CT. REV. 81.
69. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 56.
70. See David Brooks, The Campus Crusaders, N.Y. TIMES (June. 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/opinion/david-brooks-the-campus
-crusaders.html.
71. Id.
72. Id. Brooks refers to incidents where students attacked speakers who
mentioned offensive words only to condemn them. For example, Wendy
Kaminer was attacked when she used the “n” word during an event at Smith
College, and a Brandeis professor suffered the same fate for mentioning a Hispanic slur, even though he did so in the context of condemning it. Id. Relatedly, Laura Kipnis at Northwestern was accused of creating a hostile environment when she wrote an article questioning sexual mores on college campuses.
Id. Judith Shulevitz explored these and other similar examples in her wellknown New York Times essay. Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from
Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2015, at SR1.
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is that the national dialogue as a whole is more polarized,
73
which leads to greater “demonization” of the other side.
In considering what might have changed in the last few
decades, it is worth considering the possibility that public university administrators believe that developments in First
Amendment jurisprudence give them greater power to restrict
offensive speech on their campuses. Even though the Court has
continued to reaffirm that the First Amendment requires the
74
toleration of offensive speech, the Court has watered down the
First Amendment protections in various government institu75
76
tions, including the workplace and schools. In these contexts,
the Court has generally been convinced that the proper functioning of these institutions demands some flexibility in the
usual First Amendment rules. Critics of the Court’s controversial decisions in cases like R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul would ideally like the Court to revisit its protection of hate speech, but in
the meantime, they can argue that the rule of this case should
not apply in certain institutional settings, like public schools
and government workplaces. Furthermore, while the Court has
not directly held that universities are entitled to a measure of
deference when they restrict student speech on campus, in recent years the Court has expressly embraced deference in the
77
affirmative action and freedom of association contexts. Part
78
III will discuss these cases in greater detail.
II. APPLICATION OF STANDARD FIRST AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE
Because the scope of statutory liability under federal antidiscrimination law is not as broad as many believe, in at least
some situations public colleges and universities choose to restrict student speech not because they legally are required to do
so, but because they want to do so. Then the question is wheth73. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 56.
74. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
75. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
76. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
77. See cases infra Part III.A.2.
78. This may be giving professors and administrators in higher education
too much credit. I suspect that in many instances, the punishment comes first
and the legal arguments come later, if and when litigation is threatened.
Based on my personal observations, most professors, including law school professors, do not have a good grasp of the law governing student speech rights
unless they have sought guidance from university counsel.
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er the First Amendment gives them this power, and under
what circumstances. This Part will begin by examining what
the Supreme Court has said about the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws when used to restrict speech. Next, the
Part explains how standard First Amendment doctrine provides very limited protection for university attempts to restrict
or punish speech that is believed to create—or at least pose the
risk of creating—a hostile or discriminatory environment.
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S MISSING ANALYSIS
Remarkably, it remains an open question whether punishing offensive speech that creates a hostile learning environment is constitutional under the First Amendment. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never directly held that antidiscrimination laws are consistent with the First Amendment,
although it has repeatedly suggested in dicta that they are. Despite the paucity of Supreme Court precedent directly addressing this difficult issue, some commentators have proclaimed
that the constitutionality of hostile environment claims is not
79
up for debate. What is not clear, however, is the rationale for
this understanding. In light of this gap in the Court’s jurisprudence, it remains unclear how to reconcile the Court’s decisions
striking down viewpoint-based laws with its repeated suggestions that anti-harassment laws do not violate the First
Amendment. The Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of
80
Gilbert, which declared that all content-based laws are subject
to strict scrutiny, makes this even more confusing.
In 1986, the Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
that Title VII prohibited hostile environment sexual harass81
ment. The Court made clear, however, that the workplace
conduct must “affect . . . a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of em82
ployment within the meaning of Title VII.” To do so, the Court
explained, the harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
83
create an abusive working environment.’” In 1993, in Harris v.
79. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against
Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 958–59 (2009) (stating that
“[d]espite these arguments, the illegality of speech that contributes to a hostile
work environment is a fait accompli,” given what the Court has said in dicta).
80. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
81. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
82. Id. at 64–66.
83. Id. at 67.
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Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court clarified that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that a “reasonable person” would find the work
environment objectively hostile or abusive and that the plaintiff
herself perceived the work environment to be hostile or abu84
sive.
In between Meritor and Harris, the Court decided R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul. In that case, the Court struck down a local ordinance banning fighting words motivated by race, color, creed,
85
religion, or gender. In dicta, the Court noted that Title VII
was different because it banned only “conduct,” not speech, but
86
the Court offered no analysis to support this conclusion.
R.A.V. itself does not help explain the constitutionality of hostile environment laws because these laws do not target a subset
of otherwise constitutionally proscribable speech as “the worst
of the worst.” Of course some hate speech might be labeled the
“worst of the worst”; for example, as discussed in greater detail
below, the Court has held that a burning cross directed at a
specific individual with the intent to intimidate is not entitled
87
to constitutional protection. But much of the offensive speech
subject to punishment on college campuses would not fall within this category. The next part examines some other possible
justifications for carving out offensive speech from the protections of the First Amendment.
B. USING STANDARD FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE TO
RESTRICT OFFENSIVE STUDENT SPEECH
Various scholars have embraced a wide variety of First
Amendment doctrines to support the constitutionality of antiharassment statutes in the workplace and in the education context: (1) is not speech at all and therefore falls outside of the
First Amendment; (2) employees and students are “captive audiences”; (3) harassment laws are permissible time, place, and
manner restrictions; and (4) the “secondary effects” doctrine
applies. None of these doctrines works particularly well, or at
84. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
85. 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).
86. Id. at 389. Not all members of the Court agreed with this statement.
In dissent, Justice White argued that Title VII was also unconstitutional because “it ‘imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects.’ Under the broad principle the Court uses to decide the
present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment
should fail First Amendment review.” Id. at 409–10 (White, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (holding that
cross burning with the intent to intimidate is not protected speech).
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the very least, none of them can provide a full explanation for
the constitutionality of these laws, or how the schools apply
them.
It is really troubling to declare that all speech that contributes to a hostile environment is not speech at all. In Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court declared that even
laws that are aimed at “conduct” are subject to strict scrutiny if
“as applied . . . the conduct triggering coverage under the stat88
ute consists of communicating a message.” Indeed, the reason
schools want to punish students who engage in offensive speech
is precisely because the schools believe the message of that
speech is antithetical to the values and mission of the institu89
tion. Declaring that speech that creates a hostile environment
is not “speech” under the First Amendment is particularly
troubling given expanding conceptions of what kind of expressive activities are problematic. In addition, the trend in courts
around the country is expanding First Amendment coverage,
not reducing it. The real struggle right now is figuring out
whether our traditional framework for dealing with free speech
questions makes sense given this expanding scope of the First
Amendment.
“Harassment” is not a category of unprotected or lesser90
protected speech; neither is “offensive” speech. Indeed, it is
regarded as a “bedrock principle” that the First Amendment
91
protects offensive speech. That said, some harassing or offensive student speech will fall within a category of unprotected or
lesser-protected speech. The most likely categories are fighting
words, true threats, incitement, and defamation. The question
in any case will be whether the expression at issue satisfies all
of the requirements for these categories of speech. These cate88. 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
89. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993
F.2d 386, 392 (4th Cir. 1993) (involving a university that punished students
for “ugly woman contest” precisely because of its message).
90. Some scholars have suggested that the First Amendment never tolerates the restriction of speech that creates a hostile educational environment.
See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, University of Oklahoma Expels the First
Amendment, JURIST TWENTY (Mar. 14, 2015), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/03/
howard-wasserman-first-amendment.php (“The need to avoid a hostile environment is not recognized as a basis for limiting otherwise-protected, even if
hateful, expression.”).
91. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
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gories are very carefully defined and will come into play in very
few circumstances.
1. Fighting Words
Some harassing speech might properly fall within the category of fighting words, but this approach is problematic for a
number of reasons. The first is that it is not entirely clear this
category of speech even exists anymore because the Court has
not invoked “fighting words” to uphold a speech restriction
92
since Chaplinsky. The Court rejected fighting words claims in
93
94
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Snyder v. Phelps.
Even if this category of speech exists, it is unclear exactly
what it is. Historically, the Court has suggested this category
has two possible definitions: (1) offensive or abusive language
that by its very utterance inflicts injury; or (2) language that by
its very nature, judged by the probable reaction of a person of
95
common intelligence, is likely to produce a violent reaction. It
is not clear that the first type of fighting words is consistent
with modern First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has
indicated that the First Amendment requires people to tolerate
96
insulting, outrageous, and offensive speech.
The second type of fighting words is not much more promising. It is hardly clear why speech should lose protection
whenever it arouses an audience to anger. People often get angry when they hear speech they do not like. In addition, as one
scholar has noted, the concern with hostile environment harassment is not that victims will engage in violence in response
97
to the speech, but rather they will not speak at all. Another
obstacle is that for speech to constitute fighting words, it has to
98
be directed to a specific individual. Some speech certainly
92. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
93. 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
94. 562 U.S. 443, 451 n.3 (2011).
95. See id. at 465; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
96. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18–19. This result might
be different if there were a captive audience; this possibility will be discussed
in a moment.
97. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches
to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 421 (“The problem is that she is
not going to fight back—that she will be intimidated and silenced by their
heckling.”).
98. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (holding that a “Fuck the Draft” jacket did
not constitute fighting words because speech was not specifically directed to a
particular individual).
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meets this requirement, but so much speech does not. For example, the video of the fraternity members singing a racist
99
song was not directed to a particular individual. Furthermore,
the very doctrine of fighting words is inconsistent with the university setting. As one lower court has said, “Communications
which provoke a response, especially in the university setting,
have historically been deemed an objective to be sought after
100
rather than a detriment to be avoided.”
2. Incitement
Colleges and universities are on firmer footing if the offensive student speech constitutes incitement, but in most cases,
the speech will not be able to meet all of the requirements of
this category of unprotected expression.
Current First Amendment doctrine permits the punishment of speech that incites unlawful conduct, but the speaker
must have subjectively intended to incite that unlawful conduct
and directly advocated the unlawful action, and the unlawful
101
action must be “imminent.” Most speech fails to meet this
standard; the imminence requirement alone will be fatal in
most cases, particularly those cases that involve digital expression where there will almost always be a significant time delay
between the speech and action.
3. True Threats
Although the category of “true threats” will encompass
some speech that makes students feel unsafe, this category, too,
has particular requirements that will pose obstacles in some
cases.
The Court has held that the “true threats” doctrine “encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individ102
uals.” An individual need not intend to carry out the threat;
the purpose of the true threats doctrine is to protect people
from the fear of violence and the disruption in their lives that

99.
100.
2003).
101.
102.

See supra notes 1–3.
Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 370–71 (M.D. Pa.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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103

fear can cause. It is important to keep in mind, however, that
the Court has recognized that some speech containing threatening language may be fully protected speech.
For example, in Watts v. United States, the Court struck
down a conviction for threatening the President because the al104
legedly threatening statement was “political hyperbole.” In
that case, the defendant was taking part in a public rally
against police brutality and stated, “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They
105
are not going to make me kill my black brothers.” In throwing
out the conviction, the Court cited its famous assertion in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan that “debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at106
tacks on government and public officials.” The Court held
that the context of Watts’s statement, as well as “the expressly
conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners,” made it clear that the government could not show that
107
the defendant had made a true threat. Similarly, in Virginia
v. Black, the Court made clear that not all cross burning is necessarily done with the necessary intent to intimidate and that a
contextual inquiry is essential in each case to determine
108
whether that intent is present.
It remains an open issue whether the speaker must subjectively intend to place an individual in fear of violence in order
for his speech to constitute a true threat. In Elonis v. United
States, the Court failed to answer the question of whether the
First Amendment also requires a speaker to have intended to

103. Id. at 360.
104. 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
105. Id. at 706.
106. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
107. Id.
108. 538 U.S. 343, 365–66 (2003) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“As the
history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is not always intended to
intimidate.”). Justice Souter, joined by two other Justices, also recognized that
cross burning is not always done with the intent to intimidate but would have
struck down the statute as unconstitutional, rather than sever the “prima facie” evidence clause of the statute, as the plurality suggested was possible. Id.
at 380–81 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the majority points out, the burning cross can broadcast threat and ideology together,
ideology alone, or threat alone . . . .”); id. at 367 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“We also leave open the possibility that the provision is severable . . . .”).
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place the subject of the threat in fear for his or her safety.
The Court instead held that although the federal threats stat110
ute at issue in that case did not contain a scienter require111
ment, general requirements of federal criminal law require
that the government prove more than simply that the defend112
ant acted negligently. This case provides little insight into
what sort of intent standard would be required if a school relied
on the true threats doctrine to expel or suspend students; administrative punishments are not criminal in nature.
At the very least, the student’s fear would have to be “ob113
jectively reasonable.” The Oklahoma fraternity song would
not satisfy this standard, even if sometimes students might
114
claim they feel “unsafe” on campus. The song was not directed at any particular individual, and in fact the speech came
to light only after the video someone took of the bus ride was
115
posted online.
4. Defamation
False, defamatory, and unprivileged speech is actionable
116
under the common law
and considered lesser-protected
117
speech under the First Amendment. Some offensive speech on
college campuses might be actionable defamation, and school
officials would be free to punish such speech without any constitutional concerns.
That said, the tort of defamation is subject to several important limitations that will limit the usefulness of this category of speech. For example, the First Amendment fully protects
118
hyperbolic speech as well as any other statements that can-

109. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–13 (2015).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
111. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008–09.
112. Id. at 2011–12.
113. See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 2 (stating that the legal scholars they interviewed believed that the racist chant could be legally punished if
it led “a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety”).
114. See id. (stating that Oklahoma University students interviewed supported the decision to expel the chanters, based on the reference to lynching
and the fact that it might make students feel unsafe).
115. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
117. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that
a public official must prove that a defamatory statement was made with actual
malice).
118. See, e.g., Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (the
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119

not be proven true or false. In addition, individuals seeking to
restrict student speech on the grounds that it is defamatory
must overcome the tort’s “of and concerning” requirement—the
120
challenged statement must be about the plaintiff. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Court upheld a criminal libel statute
punishing speech that “portray[ed] depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race,
121
color, creed or religion,” but it is unlikely that this case is still
122
good law. It was decided before the Court recognized in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan that defamation was not entirely
123
outside the protections of the First Amendment, and group
libel seems inconsistent with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which
held that laws singling out fighting words targeting certain ra124
cial or other minority groups is unconstitutional.
The biggest obstacle for defamation claims will typically be
a failure to satisfy the requirement that the speech be “of and
125
concerning” a particular student or small group of students.
Speech that tends to lower the reputation of all students belonging to a particular group will not satisfy this standard. For
example, the “Asians in the Library” video would not be actionable defamation because the speaker referred to all Asians and
126
not to any one person in particular.
5. The Captive Audience Doctrine
It is possible that universities could look to the “captive
audience” doctrine to justify the restriction of student speech in
127
some limited circumstances. Scholars disagree on whether
First Amendment fully protects rhetorical hyperbole).
119. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990).
120. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267 (“The jury must find that the words
were published ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff . . . .”).
121. 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
122. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 672
(7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]hough Beauharnais . . . has never been overruled, no one
thinks the First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be prohibited.” (citation omitted)).
123. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 (explaining that the argument that the Constitution did not protect “libelous” publications did not end the inquiry).
124. 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
126. See supra note 20.
127. See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational
Institutions: A Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 376 (1991) (explaining that a hate speech policy “may express greater concern with speech
which occurs in a dormitory or classroom, or where there otherwise is a ‘cap-
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the captive audience doctrine can be used to justify hostile en128
vironment harassment laws. It is entirely unclear under what
circumstances the Court would be willing to embrace the doctrine because the cases have dealt with such varying factual
129
scenarios. The Court has not always embraced the captive
130
audience doctrine, and defining this doctrine is a study in
frustration. It is not clear whether and how it would apply, if at
all, on university campuses.
The Court has embraced the doctrine in the context of
131
132
broadcast television, public transportation, and unsolicited
133
134
mail, but rejected it in the context of a school board meeting
135
and in a courthouse. As J.M. Balkin has noted, “There is
simply no bright line test to tell us whether a situation of
136
speech involves coercion or not.” The Court has frequently
137
stated that confronting offensive speech is part of daily life.

tive audience,’ than with speech which occurs at scheduled rallies and public
addresses”).
128. For different views on the applicability of the captive audience doctrine to the workplace, see Balkin, supra note 97, at 423 (arguing that the average worker is a captive audience); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark,
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18–19 (noting the lack of clarity regarding when an audience is “captive” because the doctrine is “inchoate” and seems to depend
more on “the character of the place” than “the degree of audience captivity”);
Volokh, supra note 39, at 314–15 (arguing that the Supreme Court should not
find that employees in the workplace are “captive”).
129. See infra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
131. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49
(1978).
132. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305–08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority that city could ban political ads on
public transportation to protect captive audience).
133. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 735–38 (1970).
134. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
135. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971).
136. Balkin, supra note 97, at 415; see also Marcy Strauss, Redefining the
Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 (1991).
137. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (speech on matters of public concern “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or
arouses contempt”); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11
(1975) (“Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide
which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require
protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities
simply by averting [his] eyes.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at
21)); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (“[W]e have . . . consistently stressed that ‘we are
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Those who do not wish to hear offensive speech can “avert their
eyes”—or ears—and engage in counterspeech if they do not like
138
what they hear.
Applying the captive audience doctrine to the university
setting is particularly problematic. Most fundamentally, universities are a place, like the public square, where students are
supposed to confront ideas with which they disagree, some139
times vehemently. Allowing universities to silence speakers
who engage in speech other people find “offensive” seems particularly incongruous with the university setting.
Furthermore, even if the captive audience doctrine had
some application to university students, its relevance would
depend on the particular context in which the doctrine is as140
serted. The strongest settings for the application of the captive audience doctrine would be in dormitories and maybe in
141
classrooms.
The difficulty of applying the captive audience doctrine in
the dormitories, however, is that both speakers and audiences
142
call that place “home.” Students who cannot easily escape offensive speech in their dormitory common areas, bathrooms, or
rooms might argue that they should not have to tolerate such
speech when they are “home,” but likewise speakers might just
as readily contend that their speech rights should not be so
143
readily restricted when they are also speaking at home. In
addition, one of the benefits of residential life in the university
setting is to expose students to the different lifestyles, back-

often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech.’” (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738)).
138. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (suggesting that those in the courtroom look away).
139. See Balkin, supra note 97, at 424 n.103 (explaining that a university
may have an interest in “enforced toleration of the intolerant”).
140. See id. (stating that students’ interest in being free from coercion
would be different in different contexts).
141. Battaglia, supra note 127 (explaining that a hate speech policy “may
express greater concern with speech which occurs in a dormitory or classroom,
or where there otherwise is a ‘captive audience,’ than with speech which occurs at scheduled rallies and public addresses”).
142. See HOUS. & FOOD SERVS., LIVING ON CAMPUS AT THE CENTER OF IT
ALL
2,
https://ou.edu/content/dam/HousingFood/Documents/Users-Aaron
-Desktop-Forms-Exemption.pdf (“Most of the highest ranked universities in
the nation require virtually 100% of their freshmen to live on campus.”).
143. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 735–38 (1969) (“The
ancient concept that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the king
may enter’ has lost none of its vitality . . . .”).
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grounds, and beliefs of their classmates. Allowing students to
silence their classmates whenever they are offended would undermine this important benefit of residential life.
A captive audience argument in classrooms is even more
difficult because we expect students to tolerate speech they do
not like or might even find offensive when made in the context
of a class discussion. It might be possible to extend the doctrine
to extracurricular activities, although in many instances participating in such activities is not as “essential” and unavoidable
145
as attending class and living in a dormitory is.
Even if the captive audience doctrine applies in classes and
dormitories, however, it would not apply to many other settings
where public universities and colleges restrict expression. The
captive audience rational would not apply to optional lectures
146
and speakers on campus. It would not apply to speakers in
areas around campus that resemble streets, parks, and side147
walks. And it is very hard to see how the captive audience
doctrine would apply to most social media platforms, unless
students are required to use social media as part of their classes. For example, it does not appear that any University of Oklahoma student was in any way forced or coerced to watch the
148
racist SAE video discussed in the introduction of this Article,
or any UCLA student the YouTube video “Asians in the Li149
brary.”
6. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Universities may constitutionally take advantage of time,
place, and manner restrictions to limit some speech. The Court
has made clear that even in quintessential public fora, the government has the power to impose content neutral speech re-

144. See HOUS. & FOOD SERVS., supra note 142, at 3 (stating that living on
campus will lead to being able to “meet more people of diverse backgrounds
from different parts of the world”).
145. J.M. Balkin has conceded that the captive audience doctrine might
carry more weight in certain parts of the university than others. Balkin, supra
note 97, at 424 n.103 (suggesting the captive audience doctrine might have
application in the classroom and the dormitory).
146. See Battaglia, supra note 127 (stating that “scheduled rallies and public addresses” would be of less concern for school policies).
147. See Balkin, supra note 97, at 424 n.103 (explaining that speech in
dormitories would be treated differently from “arguments in the public streets
outside the campus”).
148. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
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strictions that serve significant government interests. The
important limitation on the utility of time, place, and manner
restrictions, however, is that they be content-neutral and ap151
plied even-handedly. As a result, time, place, and manner restrictions are not particularly useful in most situations where
the college or university wants to punish or restrict speech specifically because of its offensive content.
7. Secondary Effects Doctrine
The secondary effects doctrine is of even more limited assistance to universities. This doctrine has developed in the context of adult entertainment, where the Court has indulged the
fiction that zoning laws aimed at establishments that offer such
entertainment are not impermissibly content-based because
they are aimed at the “secondary effects” of that speech on
152
crime rates and property values. This reasoning seems questionable at best, but in any event, the Court has showed no
willingness to extend this doctrine beyond the context of adult
entertainment. Any attempts to apply the secondary effects
doctrine to offensive speech in the university setting should fail
because it is obvious that the regulation of such expression is
aimed directly at the communicative value of the speech and its
impact on the audience.
All in all, traditional First Amendment doctrine—even
without taking into account the Court’s cases involving the educational context in particular—give schools some ability to restrict or punish students’ expression activities. But it certainly
does not give them all of the power they might want.

150. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85, 93 (1977) (“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on
a different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether.”).
151. See, e.g., id. at 93–94 (finding that the ordinance in question was not
content-neutral, and therefore not could not be sustained).
152. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433–42
(2002) (giving deference to city to engage in zoning to address the secondary
effects of multi-use adult establishments); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (holding that zoning of adult establishments
was content-neutral under secondary effects doctrine because “[t]he ordinance
by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the
city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not
to suppress the expression of unpopular views”).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT AND STUDENTS
The Supreme Court has decided several cases in the higher
education setting involving the speech rights of students. These
decisions leave open some important questions about the scope
of a public university’s authority to restrict or punish the
speech of its students. In recent years, some lower courts have
used the courts’ decisions relating to K–12 public education to
provide this missing guidance. In addition, some lower courts
have looked to the doctrinal approach that has evolved in the
context of public employment and have increasingly recognized
the right to punish students for speech that does not satisfy
“professional” standards.
Relying on decisions in the K–12 and workplace contexts is
deeply troubling in light of the fundamental differences between universities, workplaces, and K–12 schools. The increasing use of professionalism standards is likewise dangerous because such standards are often vague and their application is
subject to the significant discretion of university administrators.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION
CONTEXT
The Supreme Court’s cases involving the free speech rights
of university students suggest that they enjoy robust protec153
tion. These cases generally contain very speech-protective
language, and the Court has time and time again singled out
the university as a special institution in the marketplace of
ideas. Simultaneously, however, the Court has indicated that it
is also appropriate to defer to university administrators. This
tension sends mixed messages and provides little guidance
when trying to determine what sort of limits the First Amend153. It is unclear whether students can stake a claim to academic freedom,
particularly when that claim conflicts with the university’s own claim to academic freedom. Some of the Court’s precedents suggest that students enjoy
some measure of academic freedom themselves. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned.”). But many scholars have argued that the
rights students enjoy rest solidly on the First Amendment and not the doctrine
of academic freedom. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom:
An Ordinary Concern of the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677, 679 (2014)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never recognized academic freedom as a unique or
‘special’ individual right under the First Amendment that inheres only in academics.”).
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ment might place on public universities’ restrictions of student
speech.
1. Student Speech Cases
In a number of cases, the Court has suggested that university students have robust speech rights. In Healy v. James, for
example, the Court held that a college could not deny recognition to a student group on the grounds that it thought the
154
group’s philosophy was “antithetical to the school’s policies.”
The overall thrust of the opinion is that the speech rights of
university students are nearly co-extensive with adults in society at large. Specifically, the Court stated:
The precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.” The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,” and we break no new
constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safe155
guarding academic freedom.

Healy left open the possibility that the college could deny
recognition to a student group that posed a likelihood of disruption or failed to follow reasonable time, place, and manner
156
rules. The Court made clear that a university would face a
“heavy burden” to justify a restraint on associational activi157
ties. The Court gave short shrift to the college’s argument
that it should not be forced to give its “administrative seal of
158
The Court held that nonofficial college respectability.”
recognition was an “impermissible, albeit indirect, infringe159
ment” of the students’ associational rights.
A year after Healy, the Court once again ruled in favor of a
student, holding that a public university could not expel a student for distributing on campus a newspaper with “indecent”
content on a day prospective students were visiting with their

154. 408 U.S. 169, 175 (1972).
155. Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960)).
156. Id. at 192–93.
157. Id. at 184.
158. Id. at 182 (quoting Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D. Conn.
1970)).
159. Id. at 183.
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160

parents. In Papish v. Board of Curators, the Court relied on
Healy to hold that a school could not punish a student for “the
mere dissemination of ideas” that were “offensive to good taste”
when the speech could not be “labeled as constitutionally ob161
scene or otherwise unprotected.” The Court also rejected the
school’s argument that its actions were the result of a valid
time, place, and manner restriction because it was clear the
student was expelled “because of the disapproved content of the
newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distri162
bution.” In a footnote, the Court also noted that the university had failed to assert that the newspaper disrupted the opera163
tion of the school. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the
Court’s “wooden insistence on equating, for constitutional purposes, the authority of the State to criminally punish with its
authority to exercise even a modicum of control over the uni164
versity which it operates.”
Until recently, the Court has held firmly that universities
cannot treat students and student groups differently based on
their viewpoints. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court held a state
university could not exclude religious groups from using the
university’s facilities otherwise open for registered student
165
groups. The Court rejected the university’s arguments that
the exclusion was consistent with its mission to provide a “secular” education and held that the usual First Amendment rules
166
applied in the university setting. Importantly, the Court explained that “an open forum in a public university does not con160. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 667–70, 668 n.3 (1973).
161. Id. at 670. The newspaper contained a political cartoon “depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice”; the paper
also contained an article entitled “M-----f----- Acquitted.” Id. at 667.
162. Id. at 670.
163. Id. at 670 n.6 (“[I]n the absence of any disruption of campus order or
interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression.”). The Court does not cite Tinker here, but this language is clearly coming from that case. Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (“[T]he record does not
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities . . . .”).
164. Papish, 410 U.S. at 677 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenters also believed that the student’s use of profanity was not protected expression.
Id. at 676.
165. 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
166. Id. at 267 (holding that once the university had created an open forum, it had “assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms” (footnote omitted)).
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fer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or prac167
and that because university students are adults,
tices,”
“[t]hey are less impressionable than younger students and
should be able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one
168
of neutrality toward religion.”
Similarly, in both Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia and Board of Regents v. Southworth, the
Court held that mandatory student activity fees are constitutional only if viewpoint-neutral criteria are used to distribute
169
them. In both Rosenberger and Southworth, the Court agreed
with the general principle that a university “must have substantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce re170
sources to accomplish its educational mission,” but it can engage in viewpoint discrimination only if it is the university’s
171
own speech. The Court explained in no uncertain terms how
dangerous the suppression of student speech on the basis of
viewpoint is in the university setting: “For the University . . . to
cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the
vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and
172
university campuses.”
Lurking in the background of Healy, Southworth, Widmar,
and Rosenberger were suggestions from various Justices that
traditional First Amendment principles should not control in
the higher education setting. Indeed, these strict principles
would clearly not make sense in some contexts. In Widmar, the
Court went out of its way to make clear that its holding does

167. Id. at 274.
168. Id. at 274 n.14. In her Rosenberger concurrence, Justice O’Connor asserted that when a forum has a “wide array” of speech, “any perception that
the University endorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995).
169. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000); Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 841.
170. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832.
171. Id. at 834 (“A holding that the University may not discriminate based
on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict
the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.”); see
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (“If the challenged speech here were financed by
tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is
the speaker.”); see also id. at 235 (“Where the University speaks, either in its
own name or through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through
its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.”).
172. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836.
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not question “the right of the University to make academic
judgments as to how to allocate scarce resources or ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
173
study.’” More specifically, Justice Stevens pointed out in his
Widmar concurrence that universities have to make contentbased decisions all the time: “They select books for inclusion in
the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic
philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curricu174
lum, and they reward scholars for what they have written.”
The question becomes how far does this deference extend; does
it extend so far as to apply whenever a college or university
contends that a speech restriction is consistent with their mission? Justice Souter raised this question in his Southworth concurrence, where he posited that “protecting a university’s discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an
important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objec175
tions to student fees.”
176
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the view that the
Court should defer to a university’s decisions took center stage.
In that case, a law student group at Hastings Law School challenged the school’s requirement that any student group seeking
official recognition and access to school funds and facilities had
177
to abide by an “accept-all-comers” nondiscrimination policy.
This is a perfect example of a school policy that the law does
not require—indeed, after Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, expressive associations are entitled to exclude members who do
178
not share their core beliefs —but Hastings adopted the non-

173. 454 U.S. at 276 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
174. Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also mentions that
schools offering extracurricular activities have to determine “the content of
those activities.” Id.
175. 529 U.S. at 239 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at
262–64 (Frankfurter, J. concurring)). In that case, the university had not
made an argument that it was entitled to deference based on its educational
mission or academic freedom principles.
176. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
177. Id. at 668. The policy, as written, was not actually an all-comers policy
but rather prohibited discrimination based on “race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation,” but the parties litigated the case in the district court as if it were an all-comers policy. Id. at 670.
178. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
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discrimination policy, it claimed, in order to promote reasona179
180
ble educational purposes and to promote inclusivity.
In evaluating the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, the
Court expressly stated that “[o]ur inquiry is shaped by the educational context in which it arises,” given the “special charac181
teristics of the school environment.” In addition, the Court
cautioned against substituting its own judgment for the “on182
the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators”
and concluded that Hastings’ policy was entitled to “due decent
183
respect” and “appropriate regard.” Although the Court ques184
tioned the wisdom of Hastings’ policy, it deferred uncritically
to Hastings’ assertion that the policy promoted the university’s
goals to encourage “tolerance, cooperation, and learning among
students” and was consistent with the State’s disdain for dis185
crimination.
The dissent complained bitterly that the majority’s deference to the university was inconsistent with Healy and the
186
Court’s other higher education student speech cases. Several
scholars have joined the lament. Richard Epstein complained
that the high level of deference the Court gave Hastings “had
the unfortunate consequence of letting Hastings run roughshod
over a weak and defenseless religious organization under its
187
Another
banner of toleration, cooperation, and learning.”
scholar noted that the decision “marks a return to an earlyAmerican understanding of student rights” that rested on the

179. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 668.
180. See id. at 694 (“Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a group’s
desire to exclude and students’ demand for equal access, may reasonably draw
a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but
no group to discriminate in membership.”).
181. Id. at 685–86 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 265, 268 n.5
(1981)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 687.
184. See, e.g., id. at 701 (Stevens, J. concurring) (“This approach may or
might not be the wisest choice.”).
185. Id. at 689 (quoting Joint Appendix II, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 081371), 2010 WL 363298, at *349). It seems odd that a goal of “toleration” requires students groups to abandon their core beliefs, rather than require students to learn to accept that there will always be other people who do not
share their beliefs.
186. Id. at 718–21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
187. Richard Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 107.
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assumption that “school officials knew better than [the courts]
188
how to educate students in their charge.”
Despite the deep chasm between the liberal and conservative Justices in Martinez, all of them agreed that the right of
the students to express any discriminatory views they wanted
remained. “Although registered student groups must conform
their conduct to the Law School’s regulation by dropping access
barriers, they may express any viewpoint they wish—including
a discriminatory one. . . . Today’s decision thus continues this
Court’s tradition of ‘protect[ing] the freedom to express “the
189
thought that we hate.”’”
The Court has never directly addressed whether universities may restrict their students’ off-campus speech consistent
with the First Amendment. In Southworth, however, the Court
did reject an argument that the university had no legitimate
interest in supporting its students’ expressive activities off
190
campus. In that case, a group of students argued that the
university should not be permitted to require them to contribute to student activity fees. In rejecting their arguments that
the support of extracurricular student speech was not “germane” to the university’s mission, the Court responded that
such an inquiry was “unmanageable. . . . [P]articularly where
the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech
191
and ideas.” The Court added that “[i]t is not for the Court to
say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an
192
institution of higher learning.” Furthermore, the Court remarked that “[u]niversities, like all of society, are finding that
traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to
insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in
communications, information transfer, and the means of dis193
course.”

188. Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and a Return to the
Early-American Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 557,
636 (2013).
189. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 696–97 n.26 (quoting id. at 706 (Alito, J. dissenting)).
190. 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (“We make no distinction between campus
activities and the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable [student organizations] . . . find[ing] no principled way . . . to impose upon the University,
as a constitutional matter, a requirement to adopt geographic or spatial restrictions.”).
191. Id. at 232.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 234.
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One issue that has come up is whether college and universities should have the same authority to restrict speech in curricular and extracurricular matters. In Martinez, the majority
rejected the argument that the university should receive less
deference on its decisions relating to extracurricular activities
because “extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of
194
the educational process.” Citing K–12 cases, the Court added
that “[s]chools . . . enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over
the type of officially recognized activities in which their stu195
dents participate.’”
As this brief history demonstrates, the Court has been
more solicitous of universities’ claims that the usual First
Amendment rules should not apply on campus and that they
are entitled to some measure of deference to determine what
speech to permit consistent with their missions. The scope of
this deference remains unclear.
2. Academic Freedom
In evaluating the ability public colleges and universities
have to restrict or punish the speech of their students, an essential consideration is how much deference should schools receive for the decisions they make. Amy Gajda contends that
“courts today often wholly disregard or discount the significance of the academic context in enforcing the First Amend196
ment.” She adds that when they do take the institutional context into account, they tend to oversimplify and focus on
students’ free speech rights without regard to the academic set197
ting. Although the Court has not been clear about how much
deference universities should get when free speech rights are at
issue, its decisions in the context of affirmative education suggest this deference could be quite broad.
As Part II reveals, public universities have a hard time relying on traditional First Amendment doctrine to justify their
efforts to restrict speech. But some scholars have argued that
universities are entitled to some measure of deference when determining what speech to tolerate on campus. This deference
can be based on two different but related theories: (i) the aca194. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010).
195. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990)).
196. GAJDA, supra note 39, at 108.
197. Id.
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demic freedom of the university; and (ii) deference to an institutional actor.
As Peter Byrne has colorfully put it, the doctrine of academic freedom “[l]ack[s] definition or guiding principle” and as
a result, “the doctrine floats in the law, picking up decisions as
198
a hull does barnacles.” Perhaps the most famous articulation
of academic freedom came in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence
199
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire. Frankfurter wrote passionately
about the importance of leaving universities unfettered “to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and be200
liefs.” Quoting a statement about South African universities,
Frankfurter wrote: “It is the business of a university to provide
that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail
‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
201
study.” Frankfurter was concerned about “governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university” that might directly or indirectly “check the ardor and fearlessness of schol202
ars.”
The government intrusion at issue in that case did not involve the appropriateness of judicial review; instead, in that
case, the New Hampshire legislature had questioned a professor about his “subversive” beliefs. If anything, Frankfurter’s
concurrence—and Sweezy as a whole—suggests that the judiciary plays an important role in checking government attempts
to interfere with academic freedom. At the same time, Frankfurter’s opinion leaves open the possibility that students also
enjoy some measure of academic freedom, although this idea
has not gained much traction in the case law. In addition, one
gaping hole in his opinion is how we should value and compare
the academic freedom of the universities, professors, and students when they are in conflict.

198. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First
Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989).
199. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
200. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10–12 (a statement of a conference of senior scholars from
the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand)).
201. Id. at 263.
202. Id. at 261, 262.
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One approach is to defer to universities to strike this bal203
ance for themselves. The Supreme Court has embraced some
deference to universities in the context of admissions, tenure
determinations, and academic standards. In Grutter v. University of Michigan, for example, the Supreme Court held that it
was appropriate to “defer” to the law school’s “educational
judgment” that “diversity is essential to its educational mis204
sion.” The Court held that judges must give a “degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitu205
tionally prescribed limits.” In subsequent decisions, the Court
made clear that, although strict scrutiny applies to affirmative
action programs, “the decision to pursue ‘the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity’ . . . is, in substantial
measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not com206
plete, judicial deference is proper.” The Court explained that
while universities cannot pursue racial quotas, “[o]nce . . . a
university gives ‘a reasoned, principled explanation’ for its decision, deference must be given ‘to the University’s conclusion,
based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student
207
body would serve its educational goals.’” In rejecting arguments that the university had failed to demonstrate that affirmative action was needed over and above its top-ten-percent
admission plan, the Court referred to universities as “laboratories for experimentation” that must be given “[c]onsiderable
deference” to “defin[e] those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educa208
tional mission.”

203. See, e.g., PAUL HOWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 127 (2013)
(arguing decisions regarding student speech are “matters of academic judgment which ought to be left to the universities themselves”); Feldman, supra
note 37 (“The balance between a civil educational community and academic
freedom is subtle and difficult. But the First Amendment should be read to
allow universities like Oklahoma to find that balance for themselves.”).
204. Grutter v. Univ. of Mich., 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
205. Id. at 328.
206. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (Fisher II) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (Fisher I)).
207. Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). The Court has accepted that
a diverse student body “promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break
down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of
different races.” Id. at 2210 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). Diversity also
“promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly
diverse workforce and society.” Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
208. Id. at. 2214 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
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The Court has also showed an unwillingness to interfere
with curriculum decisions. In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the Court rejected a procedural due
process claim brought by a medical student dismissed from
medical school at public university for her poor clinical perfor209
mance. In the course of determining that the school had afforded the student sufficient due process, the Court noted that
for at least fifty years state and federal courts had distinguished between dismissals for “disciplinary reasons” and dismissals based on “academic” performance, holding that hear210
ings might be required for the former but not the later. The
student argued she was entitled to a hearing because her dismissal was based in part on personal hygiene and timeliness
issues, which are not, in her view, as “academic” issues. The
Court rejected this argument, explaining that “[p]ersonal hygiene and timeliness may be as important factors in a school’s
determination of whether a student will make a good medical
doctor as the student’s ability to take a case history or diagnose
211
an illness.” The Court stated that “the determination whether
to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative de212
cision making.” As a result, the Court concluded that an adversarial hearing would “risk deterioration” of the “faculty213
student relationship.”
The limits of the deference embraced in Grutter are unclear. For example, relying heavily on Grutter, the AAUP argued in Rumsfeld v. FAIR that instilling values is part of a university education, and consequently academic freedom includes
not just decisions relating to teaching and research but also
“the standards and methods that faculties bring to bear to
shape the educational environment outside the classroom, including by modeling and instilling professional values that stu214
dents will carry into postgraduate employment.” Indeed, the
209. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
210. Id. at 91 n.6.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 90.
213. Id.
214. Brief for Amicus Curiae the Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors (AAUP),
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rights (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 041152), 2005 WL 2347170, at *3–4 [hereinafter Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents]. For criticism, see J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional
Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the Four Freedoms of a
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AAUP contends that pretty much everything a university does
“throughout the educational environment” enjoys academic
215
freedom. The AAUP argued that universities are entitled to
216
deference in their decisions relating to career replacement. To
support this argument, the AAUP relied on statements in
Grutter that one of the purposes of universities is to prepare
217
students for post-graduate employment.
B. TROUBLING RELIANCE ON K–12 CASES
The Supreme Court has decided four cases relating to the
free speech rights of students in public primary and secondary
schools. These cases leave open a number of important questions, including the issue of when schools can punish students
for speech that does not take place on school grounds or as part
of a school-sponsored activity. The Supreme Court has never
explicitly determined whether this series of cases applies in the
university setting, but some lower courts have done so.
1. Tinker and Fraser
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the
Court famously held that students and teachers do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
218
the schoolhouse gate.” The Court emphasized that schools
could not be “enclaves of totalitarianism” and that student
speech played an important role in the “marketplace of ide219
as.” At the same time, the Court said that a determination of
the student speech rights must be made “in light of the special
220
characteristics of the school environment.” Schools cannot restrict speech based on an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” because all expression poses the risk of an
University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 951 (2006) (“Inculcation of human values
or modeling of professional values, while legitimate, do not stand at the center
of higher education; investigation, discussion, critique, and judgment do.”).
215. Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
214, at *9.
216. Id. FAIR itself involved a challenge to the Solomon Amendment,
which threatened universities with the loss of federal funding if they excluded
military recruiters from campus.
217. Id. at *12 (“We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship. . . .” (quoting Grutter
v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003)).
218. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
219. Id. at 511–12.
220. Id. at 506.
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221

argument or disturbance. But school officials can act when
222
they “reasonably forecast” that the expression will cause a
“material and substantial interference with schoolwork or dis223
224
cipline,” or that the speech “inv[ades] the rights of others.”
The Court concluded that the school had failed to demonstrate
that students wearing black armbands satisfied this stand225
ard.
Although Tinker is often regarded as the high-water mark
for student speech rights, in recent years courts have applied
the “substantial disruption” standard expansively to give
schools broad authority to restrict their students’ speech
226
Lower courts have held that schools can restrict
rights.
speech even if there is no evidence of actual disruption; instead,
a reasonable prediction that the speech at issue would result in
a substantial disruption would be enough. In some courts, this
disruption can even be an inconvenience to the administrators,
who have to deal with the students, parents, and broad com227
munity reacting to the speech.
In addition, Tinker’s statement that schools can restrict
228
speech that “invades the rights of others” has begun to gain
traction in the lower courts, although it remains very controversial. What this language means is unclear, and there are
229
very few decisions discussing it. If “the rights of others” prong
does more than simply underscore that schools can prohibit
speech that is otherwise unprotected under the First Amendment (such as fighting words or true threats), then this approach does not add much. It is also does not add much given
230
that the “substantial disruption” standard allows schools to
231
act if speech interferes with a student’s ability to learn. But

221. Id. at 508.
222. Id. at 514.
223. Id. at 511.
224. Id. at 513.
225. Id. at 514.
226. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age,
60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2008).
227. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
228. Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
214.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 514.
231. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 674
(7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f there is reason to think that a particular type of student
speech will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or
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at least one court has held that the “rights of others” prong of
Tinker can offer a substantial alternative basis for punishing
232
student speech. In Harper v. Poway Unified School District,
the Ninth Circuit relied on this prong to uphold a school’s censorship of a t-shirt with a biblical verse and an anti-gay mes233
sage. A searing Judge Kozinski dissent attacked the majority
for embracing such a standardless and malleable approach to
234
student speech.
The Supreme Court has cited Tinker in some of its university speech cases, but it has never relied on the Tinker standard to restrict speech. In Healy, discussed above, the Court cited Tinker repeatedly, both for its broad pronouncement that
students do not abandon their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse gates and also for its recognition that First
Amendment rights can vary depending on the “special charac235
teristics” of the environment in which they are asserted. But
the Court issued a rather speech-protective decision, suggesting
that the “special characteristics” language had little impact on
236
the Court’s determination of the case. Papish also cited the
language (although not the case name) but likewise strongly rejected the university’s arguments that the usual rules of the
237
In
First Amendment did not apply on college campuses.
Widmar, the Court favorably cited Tinker’s holding that the
First Amendment must be applied “in light of the special char238
acteristics of the school environment,” but only to emphasize
that a school need not open its facilities “to students and non-

other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of substantial disruption—the school can forbid the speech.”).
232. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
233. 445 F.3d at 1185 (relying on Tinker ’s “rights of others” prong).
234. Id. at 1197–98 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on the “rights of others” prong; “[s]urely, this language is not meant to
give state legislatures the power to define the First Amendment rights of students out of existence by giving others the right not to hear that speech”).
235. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
236. Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Healy embraced the majority’s reliance on Tinker and suggested that there is a “constitutional distinction
between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other.” Healy,
408 U.S. at 203 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
237. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 n.6 (1973).
238. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1973) (quoting Tinker, 393
U.S. at 506).
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239

students alike.” The Court made clear that “students enjoy
First Amendment rights of speech and association on . . . campus” and any denial of their rights is subject to the usual strin240
gent levels of scrutiny in non-university cases.
The lower courts have not discussed at great length whether Tinker applies in the university setting. The Third Circuit is
one of the few courts to suggest that because Tinker arose out
of the K–12 context, it does not establish the proper framework
for analyzing student speech claims in the higher education en241
vironment. In DeJohn, the court declared that university officials have less leeway than public elementary or high school officials to restrict student speech and held that the following
speech code was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional:
[A]ll forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including . . . expressive, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature, when . . . (c) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work, educational performance,
or status; or (d) such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an
242
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.

The Third Circuit held that this policy was unconstitutional because it permitted the punishment of speech that had the “purpose” or motive of causing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment even if it does not in fact create a hostile envi243
ronment. The court explained that the code therefore does not
even meet the Tinker test, which requires the school to show
the speech poses a substantial risk of “actual, material disrup244
tion.” In addition, the court criticized the policy for failing to
include a requirement that the speech create severe and pervasive hostile educational environment; without such a require245
ment, the code “provides no shelter for core protected speech.”

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 310–18 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e
must point out that there is a difference between the extent that a school may
regulate student speech in a public university setting as opposed to that of a
public elementary or high school.”). The Court goes on to hold that in the university context, any speech restriction must “at least” satisfy the Tinker test.
Id.
242. Id. at 305.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 317 (“The focus on motive is contrary to Tinker ’s requirement
that speech cannot be prohibited in the absence of a tenable threat of disruption.”).
245. Id. at 317–18.
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Since Tinker, the Court has clawed back on the student
speech rights at school. This process began in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, where the Court held that schools
246
could punish students for “plainly offensive” speech. At issue
in Fraser was a speech with sexual innuendos a student gave at
247
a school assembly. The Court did not rely on Tinker’s substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others justifications; instead, the decision appeared to give schools authority
to restrict speech in order to promote “socially appropriate be248
havior.” The Court emphasized the importance of deferring to
249
public schools’ “basic educational mission” to “[inculcate] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
250
political system.” Subsequent Court opinions make clear that
schools can punish speech at school that would be fully protect251
ed if made outside of school.
It appears quite clear that Fraser itself would have come
out differently if a public university student had made the
speech at issue. College and university students do not need to
be sheltered from “bad words” or sexually suggestive language.
That said, Fraser’s emphasis on affording K–12 schools leeway
to restrict speech in order to promote their “basic educational
mission” does have possible resonance in the higher education
setting.
2. Hazelwood and the Government Speech Doctrine
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court gave
schools the authority to restrict student expression in any
school-sponsored forum—including “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school” as long
as the school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate
252
pedagogical concerns.” One reason the Court gave for giving
schools such broad authority was that high school students are
not emotionally mature and likely to be inappropriately influenced by speech on controversial issues that they believe the
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 681.
See Papandrea, supra note 226.
484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988).
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253

school endorses. Echoing Fraser, the Court once again stated
that federal courts should defer to the decisions of school administrators to restrict speech that is inconsistent with its
254
basic educational mission.
Hazelwood specifically left open the question “whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to schoolsponsored expressive activities at the college and university
255
level.” The Supreme Court has cited Hazelwood in a handful
256
of higher education decisions, and lower courts have frequently held that Hazelwood should apply in that context as well, es257
pecially in cases involving curriculum decisions. Courts explain that the reasoning of Hazelwood is equally applicable to
the university setting because universities have traditionally
exercised control over speech that occurs as part of the curriculum, and this speech clearly bears the “imprimatur” of the uni258
versity. In addition, courts have reasoned that it is appropriate to give the substantial deference to curricular decisions that
Hazelwood mandates because schools plainly must be able to
exercise all sorts of control over the curriculum in order to
teach students effectively; thus, viewpoint-based decisions are
259
inevitable. These courts contend that Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard would not be sufficient to protect the edu260
cational process.
Even in the context of curriculum decisions, however, not
all courts—and certainly not all judges—have agreed Hazelwood should apply. In one particularly significant dissent,
253. Id. at 272.
254. Id. at 266–67.
255. Id. at 273 n.7.
256. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685 (2010) (citing Hazelwood to support argument for deference); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (citing Hazelwood in context of explaining that different
legal principles would apply in a case involving the university’s own speech).
257. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir.
2004) (holding Hazelwood established appropriate standard for evaluating
challenge to acting class requirement that student speak offensive words in
script); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood in case
involving master’s degree thesis); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.
1991) (applying Hazelwood in case involving challenge to university restrictions on professor’s classroom speech).
258. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying Hazelwood to college newspaper funded by school); Axson-Flynn, 356
F.3d at 1288–90.
259. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290–91.
260. Id. at 1290.
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Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit argued that it is inappropriate to apply a standard the Supreme Court established for
“emotionally less mature high school students” in cases involving higher education, where “academic freedom and vigorous
261
debate are supposed to flourish.”
Another concern related to the application of Hazelwood to
the university context is how deferential the standard is usually applied. This deference stands in contrast to other educational contexts where courts have required universities to give
more detailed explanations for their refusals to accommodate
requests for curricular deviations. In Wynne v. Tufts University
School of Medicine, for example, the First Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for the university when it was sued for refusing to give a student an oral exam instead of a written exam
in biochemistry only after it had “demythologized the institu262
tional thought processes leading to its determination.” The
court required the institution to demonstrate that the accommodation “would result in either lowering academic standards
263
or requiring substantial program alteration.” Even in the
context of the sort of “genuinely academic decision,” the court
required the university to show that it had engaged in “reasoned deliberations” before deferring to “the faculty’s profes264
sional judgment.” The court demanded this sort of reasoned
decision-making even though there was no allegation in that
case that the university had asserted pedagogical reasons as a
pretext for discrimination.
One open question for many courts is whether the Hazelwood test can be used in higher education cases involving ex265
tracurricular activities. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion
authored by Judge Easterbrook, has held that the deferential
261. Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
262. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., (Wynne II) 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st
Cir. 1992).
263. Id. at 793.
264. Wynne v. Tufts (Wynne I), 932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
Applying the principles of Wynne I and Wynne II, a federal district court in
Massachusetts rejected a claim that Boston University must allow a student
to substitute another course for the foreign language requirement, but only
after a diverse committee met seven times to discuss whether a foreign language requirement was important for a liberal arts education. See
Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998).
265. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289–90 (suggesting it is not appropriate to apply Hazelwood outside of curricular context); Bishop v. Aronov, 926
F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that educators have traditionally enjoyed more deference in the curricular than extracurricular setting).
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standard of Hazelwood makes sense outside of the curricular
context: “Extracurricular activities may be outside any public
forum . . . without falling outside all university governance. Let
us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of
the university to manage an academic community and evaluate
teaching and scholarship free from interference by other units
266
of government, including the courts.” Other courts have disagreed. For example, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned
that Hazelwood applied “only marginally” when a public university confiscated the school-funded, student-produced year267
book. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the
readers of the yearbook were likely to be young adults, not
children, and that “[t]he university is a special place for pur268
poses of First Amendment jurisprudence.”
Some lower courts have recognized that Hazelwood at least
in part is based on giving schools the power to control speech
269
that is reasonably regarded as bearing their “imprimatur.”
Although Hazelwood predated the development of the government speech doctrine, it appears to be closely related to it. The
precise contours of the government speech doctrine are unclear,
but the basic idea is that the First Amendment does not apply
when the government itself is speaking.
The government speech doctrine allows state actors to
speak without the usual First Amendment limitations. In many
situations, this doctrine supports our common-sense understandings—for example, the U.S. Surgeon General should not
have to issue statements both supporting and condemning the
use of tobacco products—but most of its applications have been
controversial. The government speech doctrine is reflected in
cases like Garcetti, where the Court has said that public employers should be able to control whatever employees say in the
course of performing their job duties—and in student speech
cases like Hazelwood, which allow schools to restrict speech
270
that “bears the school’s imprimatur.”

266. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
267. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
268. Id. at 352.
269. See, e.g., Corlett v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 958 F. Supp.2d 795, 806
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Hazelwood applies only where the speech in question reasonably could be construed as representing the school’s own viewpoint.”).
270. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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The Supreme Court has struggled to define when the government speech doctrine is implicated. In its most recent government speech case, Walker v. Texas, the Court appeared to
set up a three-part test: (1) the relevant history; (2) the amount
of government control over speech; and (3) whether a reasona271
ble person would believe the government is speaking. In
Walker itself, the Court held that Texas’s specialty license
272
plates constituted government speech. This decision was remarkable for many reasons, but let it suffice to note that it is
hard to believe, as Justice Alito argued in dissent, that a reasonable person would believe that Texas supports the University of Florida sports program or thinks that we all should be
273
golfing instead of driving. Walker has potentially huge impli274
cations for speech rights of university students.
Although Walker appears to set forth a three-part test, the
history and control prongs are really in service of the third:
whether a reasonable observer would believe the government is
speaking. One would hope in the university context, it would be
easy enough for students to argue that it is not, in fact, reasonable for anyone to assume that their speech is the speech of the
school. As Justice O’Connor once said, “The proposition that
schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not
275
complicated.” But the problem with the reasonable observer
inquiry, as with Hazelwood’s “imprimatur” inquiry, is that it is
incredibly elastic. In the context of specialty license plates, it is
hard to imagine any reasonable person believing that the 400
different types of specialty license plates represent the State of
Texas. Nevertheless, relying in part on the answers to the history and control inquiry, the Court concluded that a reasonable
person might in fact reach that conclusion. After all, a reasonable person who does not understand the government’s obligations under the public forum doctrine might erroneously assume that the government endorses any speech that appears on
its property.

271. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
272. Id. at 2253.
273. Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
274. For a lengthier discussion of the uncertain implications of Walker, see
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. L. REV. 1195, 1226–
34 (2016).
275. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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In some lower court student speech cases, courts have concluded that granting a student a degree itself bears the imprimatur of the school. These courts usually recognize that the
underlying speech at issue—like a student’s Facebook posts—
does not itself bear the imprimatur of the school, but the decision to graduate students despite what they have posted indicates a “certification” that these students are suitable to enter
276
the profession.
3. Morse v. Frederick
One more K–12 case bears mention: Morse v. Frederick. In
that case, the Court held that public schools could restrict
277
speech that is reasonably interpreted to promote drug use.
Although the Court emphasized the “special characteristics of
the school environment” that limit student speech rights, the
Court rejected arguments that the First Amendment permits
schools to restrict any speech that they might determine is of278
fensive to the school’s educational mission. At the same time,
the Court has made clear that schools are not entitled to restrict speech whenever it interferes with their “educational
mission.” The Court expressed concerned that such a standard
would be too vague and result in the suppression of too much
speech because “much political and religious speech might be
279
perceived as offensive to some.”
All of the Court’s K–12 cases involve speech that occurred
on school grounds or during a school-sponsored activity. As a
result, they give very little guidance to lower courts grappling
with the difficult issues arising in digital communications such
280
as e-mails, blogs, and social media. Although most courts recognize the difficulties of applying Fraser and Morse to speech
281
that does not appear at school, the courts are deeply split
about whether and how to apply the Court’s K–12 school speech

276. For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Emily Gold Waldman,
University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 382, 393–98 (2013).
277. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
278. Id. at 408.
279. Id. at 409.
280. In Morse, the Court recognized that the lower courts disagreed about
when schools have authority to restrict speech outside of school. See id. at 401
(“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should
apply school speech precedents . . . but not on these facts.”).
281. Papandrea, supra note 226, at 1069–70.
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282

cases in this context. Accordingly, even if these cases were
applicable to the higher education setting they do not answer
the question of how much power public schools should have to
interfere with their students’ “off campus” speech.
4. Problems with Applying K–12 Cases to Higher Education
There are some very good reasons to doubt whether any of
the K–12 cases should apply in the higher education context.
Primary and secondary education is significantly different
from higher education. The students in K–12 are (for the most
part) minors, while students in higher education are (for the
most part) adults. While there are some unresolved questions
regarding the First Amendment rights of minors even outside
283
of the First Amendment context, there is no question that
university students enjoy the same full First Amendment
rights as other adults. Although divide between “childhood”
and “adulthood” is somewhat randomly set at eighteen for
many (but not all) legal purposes, and recent scientific evidence
suggests the development of the human brain continues
through the mid-20s, the fact remains that in our society, individuals over eighteen are indeed generally recognized to be fully developed individuals. At the very least, people who are
eighteen have the right to vote, and if nothing else, the right to
engage in free speech—and the duty to endure offensive
speech—should accompany that right. That some high school
282. Id. at 1056–69. For more recent decisions, see, for example, Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 389–96 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the school could punish a student for speech on his social media page because
it was directed to the school, and school officials thought the speech was
threatening, harassing, and intimidating); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a school violated the First
Amendment when it suspended a student who had created a fake online profile mocking the principal); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565,
570–75 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the First Amendment permitted a school
to punish one of its students for creating a MySpace page mocking another
student); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216–19 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that a school violated the First Amendment by disciplining a
student who created a fake online profile of the principal on her home computer).
283. The Court has held that the First Amendment permits some restrictions on the speech children receive. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968). The Court has never directly held that children have more
limited rights to speak, but some argue that because children are subject to
the authority of their parents and do not possess the right to vote, their right
to speak is not co-extensive with adults. For more discussion of this argument,
see Papandrea, supra note 226.
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students are adults and some university students are minors
does not necessarily argue in favor of reducing the speech
rights of university students; it could just as easily argue in favor of recognizing more robust speech rights of high school students.
One reason some give for affording even K–12 students robust First Amendment rights at school is that primary and secondary school education is compulsory in every State, and the
only choices students and families have to avoid schools with
speech restrictions with which they disagree is private or parochial school, or home schooling. Students attending public universities often face similar constraints in where they attend
school. Public universities cost far less than comparable private
universities, particularly for in-state students, and transferring
from one university to another involves tremendous costs, both
financial and otherwise. Furthermore, it is hardly justifiable to
tell a university student that he or she does not have to go to
college or graduate school. At the same time, we do not allow
people to argue that speech on their local streets and sidewalks
should be restricted because it is difficult to move to another
city; it is not entirely clear why the analysis should be any different in the university setting. In most instances, the speech is
not directed to any particular students, and students who find
the speech offensive are not a captive audience.
Those who argue in favor of speech restrictions argue that
universities, or at least parts of a university, are “home” for the
students. Indeed, many universities are residential, providing
housing for some of their students, and at many, students are
required to live in campus housing for some period of time. This
means that students do not just spend a portion of their day on
campus; they eat, drink, and sleep on campus. This tension between protecting a vigorous marketplace of ideas and creating
a comfortable “home” for students was dramatically on display
in a controversy at Yale over Halloween costumes. A group of
university administrators signed a letter urging students to be
284
culturally sensitive when selecting their Halloween costumes.
A Yale instructor was who was also the “master” of Silliman
College—one of the residential colleges at Yale—criticized the
wisdom of this admonition and faced student attacks. In a moment captured on video, a student confronted the master in the
284. E-mail from the Intercultural Affairs Comm., Found. for Individual
Rights in Educ. (FIRE) to Yale Students (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.thefire
.org/email-from-intercultural-affairs.
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residential college courtyard and yelled that her job was “to
create a place of comfort and home” for the students and not
285
about creating “an intellectual space.” The instructor ulti286
mately resigned from Yale.
These arguments about the university as a “home,” however, point just as readily, and perhaps even more strongly, in favor of protecting the rights of the speakers. At least in the K–12
context, students (theoretically) retain their full First Amendment rights when they go home. Even the lower courts that
have upheld school punishment of off-campus K–12 speech
have done so after finding some nexus with the school itself.
Students residing on college campuses cannot retreat to their
“homes” to exercise their full First Amendment rights.
Another reason given for affording K–12 students reduced
First Amendment protections at school is because the schools
are acting in loco parentis. The Supreme Court itself has given
mixed messages on this rationale; it has rejected it in the
speech context, but it has embraced it in the Fourth Amend287
ment context. Whatever the merits of this argument in the
K–12 context, it has no merit in the college and university context. Interestingly, it is true that historically it was commonly
understood that higher education institutions did have the
same rights and responsibilities as the parents of their students, but ever since the 1960s, when universities tried to punish students for participating in a civil rights movement, this
288
theory has lost traction. In addition, the doctrine was out of
place as sprawling research universities became more preva289
lent, and students were no longer under close supervision. It

285. Conor Friedersdorf, The New Intolerance of Student Activism, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/
11/the-new-intolerance-of-student-activism-at-yale/414810. Some commentators have agreed with this position. See, e.g., Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, At
Yale, the Issue Is Not Free Speech but Judgment, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/opinion/at-yale-the-issue-is-not-free
-speech-but-judgment.html.
286. Anemona Hartocollis, Yale Lecturer Resigns After Email on Halloween
Costumes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/us/
yale-lecturer-resigns-after-email-on-halloween-costumes.html.
287. Papandrea, supra note 226.
288. Tracey, supra note 188 (tracing the doctrine of in loco parentis); Joseph Storch, In Loco Parentis, Post-Juicy Campus, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept.
17, 2009), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2009/09/17/loco-parentis-post
-juicy-campus.
289. Tracey, supra note 188, at 625 (noting that with changes in the university, “the doctrine of in loco parentis no longer fit the real world of higher
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is generally agreed that colleges and universities no longer
have a custodial relationship with their students; it is purely
290
educational.
Although the wholesale application of the Court’s K–12 jurisprudence would make little sense, one aspect of these cases
would. In Morse, the Court sharply rejected the school’s argument that it should be entitled to restrict speech whenever it
interfered with the “mission” of the school. The Court was concerned that schools would readily engage in viewpoint-based
discrimination against disfavored messages in the light of protecting its mission, and thereby eviscerate meaningful First
Amendment protection for students. It is not clear why universities would be given more deference to restrict speech in keeping with their self-defined “educational missions” than local
primary and secondary schools.
C. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CASES
Some lower courts, particularly in the K–12 context, have
relied on the Court’s government employee cases to determine
the speech rights of students. This line of cases is ill-suited for
the higher education setting.
Increasingly courts have embraced the public employee
framework in the university setting when students are involved
291
in externships or clinical placements. In Watts v. Florida International University, for example, a student seeking a degree
in social work was fired from his field placement for “inappropriate behavior related to patients, regarding religion” after he
told a patient that she could seek a bereavement support group
292
in a church. In Snyder v. Millersville University, an education
student was no longer permitted to do her student teaching at a
local high school when the school administrators discovered
photos she had posted on her MySpace webpage of herself
dressed as a pirate holding a plastic cup and the caption
293
“Drunken Pirate.” In both cases, the students could not re-

education”).
290. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Enforcement of Law Schools’ NonAcademic Honor Codes: A Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?, 89 NEB.
L. REV. 634, 641 (2011).
291. See, e.g., Vejo v. Portland Pub. Sch., No. 3:14-cv-01656-AA, 2016 WL
4708534, at *8 (D. Or. Sept. 6, 2016) (applying the public employee framework
in a case where the student’s internship was terminated).
292. 495 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007).
293. No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).

2017]

RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

1853

ceive their degrees because the field placements were required
for graduation. In evaluating their free speech claims, the lower
courts assumed the framework for public employees would apply to the students’ free speech claims against their universities, as if they had sued their field placement supervisors directly.
The Court’s public employment cases, which give government employees broad authority to restrict speech, are based
on an assumption that when the government is acting as an
employer, it should have the power to restrict speech that interferes with the proper and efficient function of the workplace.
This is why the Court has held that speech related to an employee’s job duties enjoys absolutely no constitutional protec294
tion, and that public employers can punish their employees
for any speech that does not relate to a matter of public con295
cern. Although the Court has recognized that employees (like
students) do not entirely forfeit their First Amendment rights
296
by taking a job with the government, the protections they enjoy are extraordinarily limited. I have argued elsewhere that
this framework is problematic, but regardless, it is a poor fit for
evaluating the interests at stake in the higher education setting.
D. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
An increasingly popular argument for the power of universities to limit their students’ speech rights is that the restrictions are consistent with professional standards. These arguments have come into play not just in professional schools
(like law and medicine) but also undergraduate programs that
prepare students for certain careers, like teaching and even
297
mortuary science.

294. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (rejecting “the notion
that the First Amendment shields from discipline the expressions employees
make pursuant to their professional duties”).
295. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (“Our holding today is
grounded in our longstanding recognition that the First Amendment’s primary
aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the
practical realities involved in the administration of a government office.”).
296. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[W]e hold
that . . . absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him,
a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”).
297. See, e.g., Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 854–55 (9th Cir.
2015) (applying the professional standard argument to those pursuing teach-
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The argument in favor of professionalism standards is that
the mission of the schools is to prepare students for a particular
profession, and the failure to abide by certain professionalism
standards indicates an unsuitability for the profession.
One of the best examples of a case where a professionalism
standard was used is Tatro v. University of Minnesota, where a
mortuary science student suffered significant disciplinary sanctions for making posts on her Facebook page about her experi298
ence in anatomy lab. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that “a university does not violate the free speech rights of a
student enrolled in a professional program when the university
imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic
program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to
299
established professional conduct standards.”
Although the opinion cites the standard for strict scrutiny,
its analysis was anything but. The court concluded that the
student had violated an anatomy lab course rule providing that
“conversational language of cadaver dissection outside the laboratory” should be “respectful and discreet,” but “‘blogging’
about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection” was prohibit300
301
ed. “Blogging” included any speech on Facebook or Twitter.
It is hard to see how this rule is a narrowly tailored rule. It
would cover “the entire broad class of responsible, sensitive,
thoroughly professional blog posts” relating to genuine matters
of public concern, as well as blog posts that were entirely in302
nocuous. In addition, the court concluded that this rule was
“directly related to established professional conduct standards”
ing licenses); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying
the professional standard argument to those pursuing counseling licenses);
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875–76 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the
imposition of a remedial plan designed to align a counseling student’s conduct
with the ACA Code of Ethics was a “reasonable restriction on [the student’s]
speech”); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“When a school regulates speech for which it also pays . . . the appropriate
question is whether ‘the actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying the professional standard argument to actor training programs);
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2002); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816
N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012) (applying the professional standard argument
to mortuary science).
298. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512–13.
299. Id. at 521.
300. Id. at 512.
301. Id.
302. R. George Wright, Standards of Professional Conduct as Limitations
on Student Speech, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 426, 433 (2013).
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only after “[g]iving deference to the curriculum decisions of the
303
University . . . .”
Tatro specifically held that neither Tinker nor Hazelwood
provided the relevant legal standard for analysis and remarkably relied on Morse and Fraser to support its creation of an en304
tirely new “professionalism” standard. The court explained
that Tinker did not apply because the sanctions were not imposed because the Facebook posts created a substantial disrup305
tion on campus or within the mortuary program. Hazelwood
was inapplicable, too, the court held, because no one would reasonably believe that Tatro’s posts were school-sponsored
speech; in addition, the test was too permissive for the college
setting because it would potentially allow the school to censor
speech “to cover values like ‘discipline, courtesy, and respect for
306
authority.’” Tellingly, the court relied on Morse and Fraser to
support its conclusion that First Amendment rights must be
considered in light of the “special characteristics of the school
307
environment.” Here, the court concluded, the relevant school
environment was a professional school environment, which
means the university “is entitled to set and enforce reasonable
308
course standards designed to teach professional norms.”
Although the court apparently thought this professionalism standard offered students more speech protection than the
Hazelwood test, it is probably a tie at best. Under Hazelwood,
students can challenge speech restrictions by arguing that the
school did not have a legitimate pedagogical concern or that the
speech would not be reasonably regarded as bearing the
school’s imprimatur. Under a professionalism standard, a student might argue that the professional standards at issue simply do not exist, are themselves unconstitutional, or
309
pretextual.
In these professionalism cases, the lower courts have rejected arguments that schools have less—or no—authority to

303. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522–23.
304. Id. at 517–20.
305. Id. at 519–20.
306. Id. at 518.
307. Id. at 520.
308. Id.
309. Wright, supra note 302, at 429–30 (setting forth the very limited
grounds on which a student might challenge a speech restriction justified under a professionalism standard and concluding “it is difficult to imagine a student free speech claim prevailing in Tatro-like cases”).
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restrict online speech. As noted earlier, lower courts are deeply
divided in the K–12 setting about whether and when schools
can punish their students’ online speech. In the professionalism
cases, the courts tend to dodge that issue entirely by reasoning
that any speech, no matter where it is published, can demon310
strate a failure to comply with professional standards.
These professionalism arguments have an elastic character
and threaten to encompass virtually any decision a school
might make. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, an acting student
brought a First Amendment claim against the University of
Utah after she was punished for refusing to use profanity or
311
take God’s name in vain in acting class. The school claimed
that these exercises were part of its “methodology for preparing
312
students for careers in professional acting.” The school lost its
motion for summary judgment because there was evidence in
the record suggesting that this “professionalism” justification
313
was pretext for religious discrimination.
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, for example, the AAUP argued in its
amicus brief that law schools must be permitted to exclude employees who discriminate because it is against the rules of pro314
fessional conduct for lawyers to engage in discrimination. In a
University of North Carolina School of Law Halloween costume
controversy, the law school administration suggested that culturally insensitive costumes were not consistent with profes315
These two examples suggest the potential
sional values.
breadth of a professionalism standard, which would allow a

310. See, e.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a
student’s First Amendment challenge to a university decision to remove him
from the nursing program after he made Facebook posts reflecting his frustrations working with another student).
311. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280–81 (10th Cir. 2004).
312. Id. at 1291.
313. Id. at 1293.
314. Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
214, at *13.
315. The letter the UNC Law administration drafted was admittedly ambiguous. It may have been making the claim that tampering with posters was
not professional conduct. But either way, the appeal to professional standards
is notable and disturbing, particularly when the school could have simply asserted a content-neutral policy prohibiting the destruction of student posters.
The professional rules of ethics seem to have little relevance to the matter. See
Peter Bonilla, UNC, Halloween, and the ‘Professionalism’ Threat to the First
Amendment, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www
.thefire.org/unc-halloween-professionalism-threat-first-amendment.

2017]

RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

1857

public university or college to justify all sorts of speech restrictions.
IV. LIMITING DEFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSITY
Granting public colleges and universities broad deference
to restrict their students’ expressive activities is problematic on
a number of levels. As one commentator has argued, they are
“astonishingly poor guarantors of the First Amendment when
316
hateful or offensive speech is at issue.”
At the root of this question is “an impoverished understanding of the unique and complex functions performed by our
317
universities.” The university does not possess any special
right under the mantle of academic freedom to restrict student
speech as it sees fit. Instead, any speech restrictions must be
limited, as Peter Bryne has argued, to those “necessary to the
functions of higher education” in the pursuit of “truth and the
318
controvertibility of dogma.”
Although the similarities between curricular and extracurricular activities may seem arbitrary, it makes perfect sense to
give colleges and universities more leeway to control what happens in the classroom than in the dormitories, on the playing
fields, and on Facebook. As Justice Stevens argued in his
Widmar concurrence, universities have to make content-based
decisions all the time: “They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum,
319
and they reward scholars for what they have written.” Applying standard First Amendment doctrine to these decisions
would be virtually impossible and inconsistent with the academic enterprise. These sorts of decisions also seem at the core
of academic freedom, no matter how that doctrine is defined.
But even with respect to decisions relating to the curriculum, the deference the university receives should not be absolute. Professors should be given wide latitude to restrict classroom speech that is disruptive to the learning environment, as
Tinker imagined, but this disruption should be actual and not

316. Juhan, supra note 65, at 1595.
317. Byrne, supra note 198, at 254.
318. Id. at 264–65.
319. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also mentioned that schools offering extracurricular activities
have to determine “the content of those activities.” Id.
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merely speculative. Even in the classroom setting, professors
may inappropriately prohibit certain points of view or punish
students whose views are not in the mainstream.
Permitting schools to rely on professionalism standards to
deny students credit or a diploma is very dangerous. First, professionalism standards themselves are hardly free from First
Amendment controversy. A recent flood of literature is address320
ing the constitutionality of such standards. Even putting to
one side questions about what level of scrutiny to give such
rules, the rules themselves can be vague and independently
unenforceable. Tatro offers a perfect example of a case where
the professional rules mandating “respect” for the dead arguably interferes with the freedom of expression. Such a rule is of
dubious constitutionality whether it applies to a student or a
practicing mortician. Furthermore, the professionalism standards are vague and subject to abuse. While in some instances
the failure to behave professionally at an internship should be
grounds for denying credit, a lack of professional speech generally should rarely be grounds for denying a student a diploma.
Schools should take care to distinguish, as appropriate, the difference between graduating a student for fulfilling the curricular requirements for a degree and certifying a student for admission to licensure. The two decisions are not equivalent, and
they should not be treated as equivalent.
Professors and universities should not be given broad power to restrict speech outside of the classroom setting unless that
speech is unprotected speech, as outlined in Part II, or meets
the “severe and pervasive” and “objectively offensive” standard
for hostile learning environment claims under Title VI or Title
IX.
Rather than trying to make the campus as a whole a “safe
space” free of offensive speech, public colleges and universities
should support affinity groups where students can gain support
from those who share their views and background. With this
support, these students can gain confidence to enter the larger
debates occurring on campus. The “all-comers” policy in Martinez undermines how the right of association can contribute to
a robust speech environment on campus. To be sure, the right
of association is not absolute, and it can give way to anti320. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1289, 1289 (2015) (“The mere fact that the speakers are professionals and the
listeners are clients or patients does not extinguish or diminish First Amendment protections or concerns.”).
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discrimination laws, particularly when the organization’s core
321
identity is not offended by an all-comers policy. But affinity
groups, single-sex fraternities and sororities, religious groups
and other groups where limits on membership are closely related to the purposes of the organization should not be required to
admit members who will undermine the purposes of the associ322
ation.
Limiting the ability public colleges and universities have to
punish or censor speech does not mean that they are powerless
to respond when student speech is offensive and undermines
the school’s core values. Instead, they should not be afraid to
condemn that speech and explain why that speech is offensive
to the school’s values. The school should use the offensive
speech as a moment to educate the student body.
One recent example is instructive of the approach to student speech that this Article advocates. Recently at the public
law school where I teach, the administration was asked to take
action when unknown students crossed out “Black Lives Matter” and wrote “All Lives Matter” on a poster on the school’s
323
“Free Speech” bulletin board. Some students called for an investigation into the identity of the defacer and swift punishment. It proved impossible to identify the culprit, but nevertheless the administration, working with students, quickly called a
town hall meeting to discuss the incident. At this meeting, the
school came together to talk about why marking up the sign
was so hurtful to some students. In this forum, the administration heard from African-American students who said they literally fear for their lives when they are driving their cars. Other
321. But see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (holding
the Boy Scouts were not required to allow a homosexual assistant scoutmaster
to be a member of their organization because it went against the organization’s core identity).
322. This is not to say that all exclusionary student groups necessarily
have a constitutional right to choose their members without regard to discrimination laws. The Jaycees, formerly the United States Junior Chamber of
Commerce, is an organization founded to give young men training in business
and civic activities. Linda Greenhouse, Court Says States Can Force Jaycees
To Admit Women, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/
04/us/court-says-states-can-force-jaycees-to-admit-women.html. The Supreme
Court held that the Jaycees were required to admit women because they could
not demonstrate that excluding women was central to the purposes of the association. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627–28 (1984).
323. This Free Speech Board was apparently created around 2000 as a
place for students to express their political views, rather than papering the
walls of the law school. The need for such a forum was more obvious in the
pre-social media days of the early 2000s than it is today.
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students expressed frustration with the Free Speech Board as a
medium of communication because it did not foster dialogue
among people holding diverse views. By the end of the meeting,
it became strikingly clear that the incident on the Free Speech
Board was symptomatic of a larger issue at the law school,
which was the lack of dialogue on racial justice issues and
stratification and isolation of white and black students. The
path forward is hardly clear, but what is clear is that censoring
students who disagree with the Black Lives Matter movement
will not solve the issues facing the law school. Instead, censorship would simply put a band aid over the problem and potentially inflame the hostility of students who are silenced for
their own views.
Rather than misusing Hazelwood and the government
speech doctrine to interfere with the free speech rights of their
students, public colleges and universities should use their voices to engage in unmistakably government speech to condemn
speech that interferes with the core values and mission of the
324
institution. It is when the institution fails to stand up for its
core values and mission that those values and mission are most
threatened.
CONCLUSION
As the President of Brown University Christina Paxson
has said, what universities do is “difficult and important” because “we live in a society that often feels more divided and
rancorous than ever, fractured along lines of race, ethnicity, in325
come, and ideology.” Public universities and colleges need to
recognize that some of their students are suffering, and not only when they are at school. The answer to this pain, however, is
not stifling free speech but embracing it. With a continued
commitment to the foundational free speech principles and a
recognition that our universities are the marketplace of ideas,
higher education institutions can feel comfortable rejecting

324. PEN America recently embraced this same message. See PEN AM.,
supra note 4 (“When a university’s values are breached, its precepts threatened, or its constituents violated in a significant way, it is incumbent on top
administrators to speak out.”).
325. Christina Paxson, Brown University President: A Safe Space for Freedom of Expression, WASH. POST. (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/brown-university-president-safe-spaces-dont-threaten-freedom
-of-expression-they-protect-it/2016/09/05/6201870e-736a-11e6-8149
-b8d05321db62_story.html.
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calls to punish offensive speech and instead use the occurrence
of that speech as a moment to teach and engage with their students. Public colleges and universities are not powerless to address speech that undermines their core mission and values.
They can condemn speech that undermines that mission and
use the unfortunate occasion of offensive speech as a teaching
opportunity.

